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I. INTRODUCTION
The lawyer-client relationship is generally characterized as an
agency relationship, although one of a special kind. Unlike most
agents, a lawyer is not subject to the same obligation to obey the prin-
cipal's instructions regarding how to carry out his services.
A primary issue in the lawyer-client relationship is identifying
whether the lawyer or the client has the authority to make a particu-
lar decision. In a civil litigation context1 this question is answered by
distinguishing between procedural decisions (ie., affecting the means
of representation) and substantive ones (ie., affecting the subject mat-
ter or the objectives of the representation). Typically, it is said that
lawyers have authority to make procedural decisions and clients, sub-
stantive. Nevertheless, certain procedural decisions are considered so
important that they are within the client's authority.
However, even the courts do not uniformly adhere to this model.
In some cases, authority principles within the agency relationship are
interpreted to enforce settlement agreements over the client's pro-
tests. In other instances, the agency model is abandoned altogether,
such as when a client is relieved of the prejudicial effects of his law-
yer's procedural errors, or when the lawyer is presumed to have both
substantive and procedural authority. Because the contours of the
line between lawyer and client authority are hazy, lawyers and clients
cannot predict how courts will decide disputes regarding decisionmak-
ing authority.
1. This Article is limited to civil litigation for several reasons. Most reported au-
thority disputes arise in this context. Disputes arising out of the office lawyering
context, in contrast, rarely result in litigation. In criminal defense representa-
tion, the defendant's sixth amendment rights create a different kind of lawyer-
client relationship.
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This Article contends that deciding these disputes by relying on
the agency theory and the distinction between substance and proce-
dure is inappropriate. The agency theory does not accurately describe
the lawyer-client relationship because a lawyer possesses unique skills
and expertise and owes competing duties to the client and to the judi-
cial system. The substance/procedure distinction is designed to ac-
commodate these considerations. However, by relying on an
inaccurate model and an artificial distinction, this scheme obscures the
interests that drive courts to make exceptions to the typical distribu-
tion of authority. In addition, by imposing this scheme on all clients,
regardless of their degree of sophistication, important differences re-
garding the distribution of authority in individual lawyer-client rela-
tionships are ignored.
Instead of attempting to categorize decisions as procedural or sub-
stantive and then applying agency principles, the courts should openly
decide these disputes by balancing the clients' interests in lawyer-cli-
ent relationships with the interests of third parties and the public in
judicial efficiency. This is particularly important in deciding whether
to uphold a settlement in the face of a client's objections based on the
client's interest in making the settlement decisions. A clearer state-
ment of the important interests would also serve to educate lawyers
on how they should interact with their clients, as well as third parties,
to prevent these disputes from arising.
Part II of this Article reviews the authority principles under
agency theory and the substance/procedure distinction in the lawyer-
client relationship. It then analyzes how those principles are applied
to decisions which reflect this allocation of authority. These decisions
support the lawyer's authority in procedural matters, despite conse-
quences to the client, and the client's authority in substantive and im-
portant procedural decisions, in particular over whether to accept or
reject a settlement. Part III discusses the distortion and abandonment
of the traditional agency model, by examining decisions which grant
relief from the lawyer's procedural errors and decisions which uphold
settlements despite the client's objections.
Part IV reviews other possible theoretical approaches to the law-
yer-client relationship. Part V suggests a model, developed from em-
pirical studies of the lawyer-client relationship and theoretical
criticisms, to determine the outcome of lawyer-client authority
disputes.
Part VI analyzes cases involving settlement disputes and contends
that the suggested model explains the results in these cases better
than the traditional agency model. The Article concludes that the
proposed model provides a clear and accurate basis for analyzing ques-
tions of disputed authority in the lawyer-client relationship.
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II. THE LAW OF AGENCY APPLIED TO LAWYERS
A. Defining the Lawyer as Agent
One important legal basis of the lawyer-client relationship is the
law of agency.2 Agency law governs the ability of the attorney to bind
his client to an agreement or stipulation.3 In a typical agency relation-
ship, the principal controls the conduct of the agent regarding matters
entrusted to him,4 and an agent is obligated to obey all reasonable di-
rections regarding how to perform a service for which he has been
engaged.5
The Restatement of Agency recognizes that a client is limited in his
control over his attorney. Despite the obligation to obey instructions,
an attorney has complete control over court proceedings and may
withdraw from the case if the client prevents him from acting as he
thinks best.6 This important exception is based on the general notion
that "the employer will not interfere with the method of conducting
proceedings which are customarily left in the control of an agent."7
The Restatement also classifies lawyers as agents who are in fact
independent contractors, and therefore not subject to a principal's
control of their physical conduct in the performance of services.8
Thus, it has long been recognized that when a lawyer is acting in his
professional capacity, "he is an agent of a somewhat unusual sort." 9
Once the client-lawyer relationship is established, questions arise
about the extent of the lawyer's authority10 as an agent to act for the
2. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 4.1 (1986)(discussing Patterson, Legal
Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 913 n.18 (1980)). See
H. REUSCELEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 21
(1979).
"Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of con-
sent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to
his control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1(1)(1957).
The fiduciary aspects of the lawyer-client relationship include a duty of loy-
alty (devotion to the client and his cause as well as avoiding representation where
other interests arise that might limit the lawyer's devotion to the client), confi-
dentiality, competence, trust, and protection of the client unfamiliar with the
legal process. See C. WOLFRAM, supra, § 4.1.
3. Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 389 (3d Cir. 1986).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1957).
5. Id. § 385(1)(1957).
6. Id. § 385 comment a (1957).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 14N comment a (1.957).
9. F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 2159 (2d ed. 1914).
10. "Authority is the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal
by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to him."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1957). Issues of authority address
whether an agent was supposed to, should, or should not bind a principal. H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 2, § 13.
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client, as well as the client's liability and responsibility for his lawyer's
actions.- Courts traditionally have held that lawyers have wide au-
thority to act on behalf of their clients, particularly in procedural as-
pects of litigation.12 This authority may be actual (express or
implied),'3 incidental,14 or apparent (also called ostensible).15 These
concepts are important in understanding how courts analyze the ex-
tent of a lawyer's authority.
Express actual authority is the power of the agent to perform an
act on behalf of the principal based on the principal's specific and clear
manifestations to the agent that a particular act be done.16 In addition
to these express manifestations, authority may be created by implica-
tion, from words used in communications between a principal and
agent, from custom, or from the relations of the parties.17 Thus im-
plied actual authority can be created by directing an agent to take ac-
tion which involves the performance of other acts in order to
accomplish the direction. It may also be inferred from words or con-
duct which the principal has reason to know indicates to the agent
that he is to do the act for the benefit of the principal.18
Incidental authority is the authority to do all those acts which are
incidental to conducting a transaction, usually accompany it, or are
reasonably necessary to accomplish it.9 Thus, it is not necessary and
may be impossible for the principal to spell out every detail in grant-
ing authority.20 Incidental authority may also be an aspect of implied
authority.21 In terms of a lawyer involved in litigation, a grant of inci-
11. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY ch. 8 (1957). "A person has
notice of a fact if his agent has knowledge of the fact, reason to know it or should
know it, or has been given a notification of it, under circumstances coming within
the rules applying to the liability of a principal because of notice to his agent." Id.
§ 9(3) (1957).
12. E.g., "[u]nder Georgia law, an attorney is cloaked with apparent authority to
enter into a binding agreement on behalf of a client." Glazer v. J.C. Bradford &
Co., 616 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1980). See also CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 283 (West
1982); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 4.2.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 comment c (1957).
14. Id. § 35 (1957).
15. Id. § 8 (1957).
16. "It is well settled that an attorney may compromise his client's case when the
client has given him the express actual authority to do so." Edwards v. Born, 792
F.2d 387,389 (3d Cir. 1986). See also REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 com-
ments a, c (1957); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 2, § 14, at 36.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 comment c (1957). "Authority to do an
act can be created by written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the principal
desires him so to act on the principal's account." Id. § 26 (1957).
18. Id. § 26 comment c (1957).
19. Id. § 35 (1957).
20. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supna note 2, § 14, at 37-38.
21. "Implied authority is actual authority circumstantially proven from the facts and
circumstances attending the transaction in question and includes such incidental
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dental authority has been defined as the authority "to do all acts in or
out of court necessary or incidental to the prosecution or management
of the suit, and which affect the remedy only, and not the cause of
action." 22
The final kind of authority is apparent or ostensible authority.23
"Apparent authority... is found where the 'agent' may or may not
have actual authority to act for the principal, but because of the behav-
ior of the 'principal' the third party believes, in good faith, that the
'agent' acts with authority."24
Apparent authority is often created when an agent is appointed to
a position which includes implied authority to perform a variety of
acts as defined by business customs, unless his authority to do those
customary acts was forbidden by the principal. Implied authority may
be converted to apparent authority with respect to third parties who
know about an agent's position and have no reason to believe that the
principal has limited the agent's authority.25 In the lawyer-client rela-
tionship, in most jurisdictions, an attorney does not possess the au-
thority to compromise a matter solely by virtue of his representing a
client in certain litigation.26
A client may vest his attorney with apparent authority to settle
through his representations to the opposing party.27 As in other
agency relationships, such representations may include the principal's
written or spoken words or any other conduct which, reasonably inter-
preted, causes the third person to believe that the principal consents
to the agent purporting to so act for him.28 Thus, like implied author-
ity, apparent authority is created by the manifestations of the princi-
authority as is necessary, usual and proper as a means of effectuating the purpose
of the employment." H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 2, § 14, at 41
(quoting Stevens v. Frost, 140 Me. 1, 32 A.2d 164 (1943)).
22. H. REUSCHLEiN & W. GREGORY, supra note 2, § 54, at 54 (quoting Moulton v.
Bowker, 115 Mass. 36, 40, 15 Am. REP. 72 (1874)).
This grant of authority is reflected in the ethical standards for lawyers. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a)(1983)("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation .. "); Id.
Rule 1.2 comment ("in questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibil-
ity for technical and legal tactical issues .... ."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) ("In certain areas of legal representation not affect-
ing the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a
lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to
make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the frame-
work of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer").
23. The two terms are synonyms. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 comment
e (1957).
24. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 2, § 23.
25. H. REUSCHEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 2, § 23.
26. Edwards v. Born, 792 F.2d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 1986).
27. Id.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1957).
[Vol. 69:473
ABANDONING THE AGENCY MODEL
pal, except that the receiver of this conduct is the third person rather
than the agent.29 If the third person and the agent rely on the same
information, or if the manifestation is entirely unambiguous, the ap-
parent authority of the agent is the same as the authority of the
agent.30
Courts use two additional concepts to analyze a lawyer's authority.
First, authority may be created by the principal's acquiescence to the
actions of an agent. If the principal, having knowledge of the agent's
conduct, fails to object to the continuance of that conduct, this acquies-
cence constitutes a manifestation to the agent that he is authorized to
continue as he has been doing.31 When such acquiescence refers to a
particular act previously done by the agent, then the principal is said
to have ratified the act originally done without authority.3 2
Second, an agency relationship may be created by estoppel. 33 As in
other applications of the estoppel doctrine, the third party must both
rely upon and change position based on his belief that the agent acted
on behalf of the principal.34 Moreover, if the principal knows of the
third party's belief and knows that the party might act in reliance
upon it, he may then be liable as a party to the transaction for remain-
ing silent.3 5
The following section will discuss how the agency model and asso-
ciated authority principles are typically applied in a civil litigation con-
text. In particular it will analyze the use of the substance/procedure
distinction to allocate authority within the lawyer-client relationship.
B. The Substance/Procedure Distinction
In seeking to define the limits of the lawyer's authority as an agent,
courts have attempted to distinguish between procedure and sub-
stance. Courts recognize that lawyers are allowed much implied au-
thority in civil litigation matters to take routine steps without
consulting their clients. In contrast to other agency relationships, a
lawyer has this broad control because of his unique legal training and
expertise, as well as his obligations to the legal system. His authority
is tempered by the court's control36 and the potential for disciplinary
29. Id. § 27 comment a (1957).
30. Id. § 27 comment e (1957).
3L H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 2, § 15.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENcY § 82 comment a (1957); L REuscHLIN & W.
GREGORY, supra note 2, § 27.
33. REsTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 8 B & comment b (1957).
34. Id. comment b, § 8 comment d (1957). The difference between estoppel and os-
tensible authority is that the former only prevents harm to the third party while
in the latter, the client has the rights of a principal under the agreement. Id. § 8
comment d.
35. See id. § 8 B comment d (1957).
36. In two cases settlements were overturned because lawyers failed to disclose cru-
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action for misuse of authority. It is also limited to protect the client's
prerogative to make decisions about the conduct of his personal or
business affairs. In order to define the limits of the lawyer's authority,
courts have divided decisions into three categories: substantive, sub-
stantial procedural, and routine tactical decisions.
1. Settlement Agreements as Substance.
Clients generally decide whether to accept or reject settlement
agreements; these are the clearest examples of substantive decisions
belonging to the client.37 Thus, in most jurisdictions, the rule prevails
that an attorney has no implied authority to settle a client's litigation
solely because he represents that particular client.38 In cases where
cial information to the opponent, violating their ethical duties. Vizri v. Grand
Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Kath v.
Western Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).
37. Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 77-78, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534-
35 (1984)(a lawyer is not liable to a third party for failing to persuade a client to
settle a matter, noting that "a lawyer may strongly advise action by a client, ac-
tion highly beneficial to the client or others .... but there is no duty on the part
of the client to follow the lawyer's lead - that is not the nature of the relation-
ship .... ); Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 71 Ill. 2d 306, 313-15, 375
N.E.2d 118, 122 (1978)(a lawyer committed malpractice when he failed to make a
settlement offer in spite of having specific authority to do so); Rizzo v. Haines, 520
Pa. 484,501,555 A.2d 58, 66 (1989)(a lawyer's failure to investigate fully the mean-
ing of a settlement offer and to convey the offer to the client gave rise to a claim
for legal malpractice); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.2(a)
(1983) ("[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of
settlement of a matter"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7
(1980)("in civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settle-
ment offer .... ).
In another context, the decision whether to take an appeal is the client's.
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 361, 363 (10th Cir.
1958).
38. Matzo v. Postmaster Gen., 685 F. Supp. 260, 262 (D.D.C. 1987). Accord Neely v.
Central Bank, 492 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Ala. 1986)(defendant could not enforce oral
settlement agreement entered into by plaintiff's lawyer); Cross v. District Court,
643 P.2d 39, 41 (Colo. 1982)(plaintiff's lawyer had no implied or special authority
to settle matter when he stated at the defendant's sentencing on a related crimi-
nal charge that the plaintiff would be satisfied with the payment of his medical
bills); Henderson v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea, Co., 374 Mich. 142, 147, 132 N.W.2d 75,
78 (1965)(plaintiff was not bound by an agreement reached by her attorney with-
out her knowledge and who then forged her signature to the settlement check
and cashed it); Gucciardo v. Norman, 139 A.D.2d 562, 564, 527 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64
(1988)(an oral settlement agreement entered into by defendant's attorney with-
out his knowledge was unenforceable against defendant, unless plaintiff proved
that defendant's lawyer in fact had authority); Archbishop v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535,
539-41, 299 A.2d 294, 296-97 (1973)(defendants' lawyer did not have the implied or
apparent authority to make admissions in a brief that led to the court's ruling in
the plaintiff's favor because, "[i]n this Commonwealth the litigant is the com-
plete master of his own cause of action in matters of substance; he may press it to
the very end regardless of the facts and law arrayed against him"); New England
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the client seeks relief from the lawyer's settlement actions, courts typ-
ically inquire whether the client gave his lawyer express39 or appar-
ent40 authority, including whether the client may have ratified the
settlement or done something which created an estoppel.41
Various circumstances may serve to demonstrate that a lawyer
lacked express authority to enter into a settlement agreement. For
instance, the lawyer may not have informed the client before set-
tling,42 or may have purported to have obtained approval from some-
one other than the client (such as a spouse or another client) who
Educ. Training Serv., Inc. v. Silver St. Partnership, 148 Vt. 99, 104-06, 528 A.2d
1117, 1119-21 (1987)(In rejecting plaintiff's attempt to enforce a settlement for
$60,000, the court rejected the argument that the authority of defendant's lawyer
could be implied from his retention with express authority to negotiate, his spe-
cific authority to settle for $10,000 and the extensive history of negotiations. The
court distinguished between retention with authority to negotiate and retention
with authority to bind his client to a settlement agreement without express per-
mission.). See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 4.6.2; Annotation, Author-
ity of Attorney to Compromise Action, 30 A.L.R.2d 944, 945 (1953).
39. Bowden v. Green, 128 Cal. App. 3d 65, 73, 180 Cal. Rptr. 90, 94-95 (1982)(defend-
ants' lawyer had no authority to dismiss their cross-complaint without express
authorization from his clients). If a settlement agreement involves conveying an
interest in real property, a lawyer must have express authority to enter the agree-
ment. Garn v. Garn, 155 Ariz. 156, 745 P.2d 604 (1987)(husband could not author-
ize lawyer to enter a stipulation to convey or encumber community real property
without wife's consent); Morr v. Crouch, 19 Ohio St. 2d 24, 29-30, 249 N.E.2d 780,
783-84 (1969)(a client overturned a settlement conveying real estate 19 months
after its entry because the lawyer made the agreement absent specific authority);
Ottawa County Comm'rs v. Mitchell, 17 Ohio App. 3d 208, 478 N.E.2d 1024
(1984)(lawyer lacked apparent or implied authority to convey an interest in real
property).
40. Edwards v. Born, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 580 (D.V.I. 1985), vacated and remanded 792
F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1986) on remand 22 V.L 426 (1986). New England Educ. Training
Serv., Inc. v. Silver St. Partnership, 148 Vt. 99, 104, 528 A.2d 1117, 1120-21
(1987) (negotiations in "an atmosphere of offers" made by the lawyer on behalf of
the client did not substitute for conduct by the principal [ie., the client] to sup-
port a finding of apparent authority.).
41. Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246,252-53 (6th Cir. 1981)(employment discrimi-
nation plaintiff repudiated settlement before decree formalized or check cashed);
Bowden v. Green, 128 Cal. App. 3d 65, 73,180 Cal. Rptr. 76,94 (1982); Robinson v.
Hiles, 119 Cal. App. 2d 666, 671-72, 260 P.2d 194 196-97 (1953); Augustus v. John
Williams & Assocs., Inc., 92 N.M. 437, 440, 589 P.2d 1028, 1031 (1979)(plaintiffs
were not estopped from denying that their attorney lacked authority to settle on
their behalf because their attorney advised the opponent's attorney that he
lacked authority to settle without his client's approval); Henderson v. Great At.
& Pac. Tea Co., 374 Mich. 142,147,132 N.W.2d 75,78 (1965); Northwest Realty Co.
v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 119 N.W.2d 114 (1963)(It is insufficient for a lawyer to rely on
opposing counsel to keep his client advised or to obtain authority to settle as he
did. It is also insufficient to rely on fact that opposing lawyer previously repre-
sented the opposing client).
42. Surety Ins. Co. v. Williams, 729 F.2d 581, 582-83 (8th Cir. 1984); Blake v. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., 241 Kan. 795, 799-800, 740 P.2d 79, 81-82 (1987); Melstein v.
Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 116 A.D.2d 632, 497 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1986); Morr v.
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could not approve the agreement on the client's behalf.43 A client has
likewise been relieved of a settlement when his lawyer fraudulently
signed the client's name to a settlement agreement, endorsed the set-
tlement check, and then absconded with the funds, even though this
may mean that the defendant will have to pay the claim twice.44
To preserve the client's realm of authority, courts narrowly con-
strue instructions which might otherwise suggest that a lawyer had
express or implied authority to settle on the client's behalf.45 Like-
Crouch, 19 Ohio St. 2d 24, 27, 249 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1969); Northwest Realty Co. v.
Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 67 119 N.W.2d 114, 117 (1963).
43. Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975)(two clients
could not be forced to accept a settlement approved by other 16 plaintiffs despite
retainer agreement that provided that majority rule would govern acceptance of a
settlement); Garn v. Garn, 155 Ariz. 156, 745 P.2d 604, 610 (1987)(husband could
not bind wife to a settlement affecting community property); Jeffery S. H v. Jef-
fery S., 76 Cal. App. 3d 65, 142 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1977)(six years after execution of
the agreement and three years after defendant in a paternity action became of
age, defendant set aside a settlement agreement executed by his father, who was
not his guardian ad litem); Rothrock v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d
616, 43 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1965)(insurer's settling an action against the insured was
overturned because it prejudiced the insured's action arising out of the same acci-
dent); Blake v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 241 Ken. 795, 799-800, 740 P.2d 79, 82
(1987)(two co-conservators cannot speak for a third); Kinkaid v. Cessna, 49 Md.
App. 18,24,430 A.2d 88,91 (1981)(wife could not bind husband in personal injury
settlement).
44. Silver v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 134,143-46,528 P.2d 1157,1163-66,117 Cal. Rptr. 821,
827-30 (1974)(attorney disciplined for settling contrary to client's wishes, forging
client's signature, and delaying payment of proceeds of settlement); Whittier
Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507-10, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 86, 89-90 (1977)(personal injury action); Nehleber v. Anzalone, 345 So. 2d
822 (Fla. 1977)(personal injury action); Miotk v. Rudy, 4 Kans. App. 2d 296, 605
P.2d 587 (1980)(personal injury action); Perkins v. Philbrick, 443 A.2d 73, 75 (Me.
1982)(in this personal injury action, the court noted that by accepting the forged
check as an "advance" on the settlement, the client did not ratify the settlement
because the client had no knowledge of the fact that the check was a forgery);
Henderson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 374 Mich. 142,144,147-48,132 N.W.2d 75,
76, 78 (1965)(personal injury action); Coates v. Drake, 131 Mich. App. 687, 694-95,
346 N.W.2d 858, 861-62 (1984)(personal injury action); Morris v. Ohio Casualty
Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St. 3d 45, 49-51, 517 N.E.2d 904, 907-10 (1988)(fire damage).
However, in Alvarado Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d
476, 483, 219 Cal. Rptr. 52, 55 (1985), after a lawyer absconded with the settlement
of a wrongful death action and the client sought relief from the bar's client secur-
ity fund, the court held that such an action ratified the client's unauthorized set-
tlement because the fund acts as an insurer of the attorney's conduct for the
client's benefit and the same issues were focused on in the fund's hearing. In-
stead of denying the client's motion to set aside the dismissal of the lawsuit, the
court gave the client the option to return the money to the fund and pursue the
underlying lawsuit. Id. at 484, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 56. The court declined to com-
pound the thievery of her first lawyer with her second lawyer's error of failing to
advise her that she would lose her rights by pursuing the action against the fund.
Id.
45. Lockette v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1987)(when
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wise, courts examine the terms of a settlement to determine whether
a lawyer would have been expected to obtain the consent of the client
before settlement,46 and other surrounding circumstances.4 7
Similarly, courts restrict the indicia of apparent authority in order
to relieve clients from settlement agreements.48 For instance, it has
client told lawyer that she had to "consult with someone else" before accepting a
settlement, she revoked whatever authority she had given to the lawyer when
she had told him to "use his best judgment" to settle matter); Turner v. Burling-
ton N.R.R, 771 F.2d 341, 345 (8th Cir. 1985)(lient's statement, "I suppose I'm
going to have to settle and I'll call you," was not an acceptance of an offer con-
veyed orally to the client by his lawyer); Bice v. Stevens, 160 Cal. App. 2d 223, 233,
325 P.2d 244, 251-52 (1958)(plaintiff's leaving "the procedure of the trial" to the
lawyer did not give the lawyer the authority to dismiss the action with prejudice);
Burns v. McCain, 107 Cal. App. 291, 290 P. 623 (1930)(client was not bound to
settlement because she instructed her lawyer to settle other related litigation
before accepting settlement); Bursten v. Green, 172 So. 2d 472,475 (Fla. 1965)(let-
ter authorizing attorney to "negotiate settlement thereof" did not unequivocally
authorize lawyer to enter binding stipulation); McAllister v. Hayes, 165 Ill. App.
3d 426, 428, 519 N.E.2d 71, 72 (1988)(counsel's acceptance of personal injury settle-
ment was not binding because authorization to accept was conditioned on a doc-
tor's reexamination of plaintiff); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Patrnon, 119 Mich. App.
772, 776-77, 327 N.W.24 355, 357 (1982)(questionable whether client gave lawyer
specific authority to settle); Szabo v. City of New York, 127 Misc. 2d 1027, 1028,
487 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1008-09 (1985)(even if client authorized her lawyers "to settle
on whatever terms they deemed reasonable," she was still entitled to reject
agreement); Johnson v. Tesky, 57 Or. App. 133, 136-37, 643 P.2d 1344, 1347
(1982)(client's authorizing lawyer to conduct settlement negotiations was not tan-
tamount to authorization to enter into binding agreement).
46. Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Paramount Indus. Inc., 829 F.2d
644, 646 (8th Cir. 1987)(defendants were entitled to a hearing on whether their
attorney had authority to enter into settlement when they were not present in
court and which imposed personal liability on defendants through guarantees);
Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979)(onerous and
costly notice requirements in stipulated injunction made it dubious that client
would have given lawyer authority to agree to its terms); DeGroat v. Ingles, 143
Cal. App. 3d 399, 191 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1983)(the terms of the settlement agreement
were conditional on the state compromising its lien; when state refused to com-
promise, plaintiff was not bound to settlement even though defendant offered to
increase amount of payment); Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 66, 119
N.W.2d 114,116 (1963)(terms were complex and important and should have been
in writing).
47. Coates v. Drake, 131 Mich. App. 687, 695, 46 N.W.2d 858, 861-62 (1984) (forgery of
settlement agreement and check endorsement); Augustus v. John Williams & As-
socs., Inc., 92 N.vL 437, 440, 589 P.2d 1028, 1031 (1979)(opposing attorney knew
that lawyer lacked authority); Slavin v. Polyak, 99 A D.2d 466, 470 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39
(1984)("party who relies on the authority of an attorney to compromise an action
in his client's absence deals with such an attorney at his own peril .. ").
48. Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387,392 (3d Cir. 1986). The following factors were
insufficient to prove apparent authority: 1) that the same lawyer had represented
plaintiffs throughout the suit; 2) that the lawyer had transmitted all communica-
tions between the defendants and plaintiffs; 3) that the pretrial order required
the lawyer to appear with the client or with authority to settle; and 4) that the
client had allowed the lawyer to select the examining physician. Id. at 390. On
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been held that a local court rule requiring lawyers attending a pretrial
conference to have full settlement authority did not automatically cre-
ate apparent authority to settle without the client's approval.49 Where
an estoppel argument is invoked to establish authority and enforce a
settlement agreement, courts have tended to set aside the agreement
when the client objects relatively quickly.50 Where the client was un-
aware of the settlement,51 however, or if unusual circumstances such
as duress52 were alleged, even delay does not bar relief. Finally, courts
remand the defendants agreed that there was no apparent authority because the
plaintiffs had not directly contacted them. Edwards v. Born, 22 V.I. 426 (1986).
Accord Fennell v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 502-03 (2d Cir. 1989)(no apparent
authority even though: 1) lawyer had represented plaintiff in dealing with other
side; 2) lawyers were authorized to appear at conferences; 3) plaintiff knew that
settlement was being discussed; 4) plaintiff did not tell his lawyer to stop discuss-
ing settlement; 5) plaintiff would have taken more money; and 6) plaintiff did not
tell opposing counsel that his lawyer's authority was limited).
49. Lodowski v. Roenick, 227 Pa. Super. 568, 572-73, 307 A.2d 439, 441 (1973).
50. Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1979)(client acted
within nine days to amend a stipulated injunction which included onerous notice
provisions); Bice v. Stevens, 160 Cal. App. 2d 222, 224-25, 325 P.2d 244, 246
(1958)(clients moved to correct lawyer's dismissal with prejudice in 46 days and
before the trial on the merits was calendared); Robinson v. Hiles, 119 Cal. App. 2d
666, 673-74, 260 P.2d 194, 197-98 (1953)(three months was a reasonable time to
move to set aside dismissal with prejudice); Burns v. McCain, 107 Cal. App. 291,
294, 290 P. 623, 624-25 (1930)(client acted within 18 days of learning of stipula-
tion); Cross v. District Court, 643 P.2d 39, 40 n.2 (Colo. 1982)(plaintiff's lawyer
informed defendant's counsel within hours of making erroneous statement that
he had no authority to settle matter); Bursten v. Green, 172 So. 2d 472, 473-74
(Fla. 1965)(client repudiated agreement one day after it was approved by court);
McAllister v. Hayes, 165 IM. App. 3d 426, 428, 519 N.E.2d 71, 71-72 (1988)(defend-
ant's attorney was advised five days after settlement that plaintiff wanted medi-
cal reexamination before agreeing to settlement); Kinkaid v. Cessna, 49 Md. App.
18, 19-20, 430 A.2d 88, 89 (1981)(client rejected settlement eight days after filing
and filed motion within three months); Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62,
64, 68, 119 N.W.2d 114, 115, 117 (1963)(client moved "promptly" [within one
month] to vacate unauthorized stipulations).
51. In re Marriage of Park, 27 Cal. 3d 337, 345-46, 612 P.2d 882, 888, 165 Cal. Rptr. 792,
798 (1980)(four years delay in moving to set aside an interlocutory judgment, en-
tered after a hearing in which the lawyer who allegedly represented the absent
wife did nothing, was explained by the wife's involuntarily deportation); Bowden
v. Green, 128 Cal. App. 3d 65, 69, 180 Cal. Rptr. 90, 92 (1982)(one year delay in
moving to correct judgment dismissing cross-complaint); Whittier Union High
School Dist. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 136 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88
(1977)(twenty months to file motion to vacate); Morr v. Crouch, 19 Ohio St. 2d 24,
25-26, 249 N.E.2d 780, 781-82 (1969)(19 month delay in filing motion to vacate
judgment).
52. Wuest v. Wuest, 53 Cal. App. 2d 339, 127 P.2d 934 (1942)(plaintiff waited nearly
one year to file motion to vacate divorce decree after lawyer agreed to settlement
under threat from judge, and client was unaware of terms of agreement); In re
J.H., 144 Vt. 1, 3, 5, 470 A.2d 1182, 1184-85 (1983)(agreement relinquishing paren-
tal rights obtained under pressure was overturned more than one year after exe-
cution). See also Oakes v. Kanatz, 391 N.W.2d 51, 53-54 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986)(client states a claim for malpractice if she can show, inter alia, that her
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may grant relief by finding that the opposing side would not be
prejudiced by declining to enforce the agreement and reinstating the
action.53
2. Important Procedural Matters as Substance
As the California Supreme Court declared in Linsk v. Linsk,54
"[tihe attorney is authorized by virtue of his employment to bind the
client in procedural matters arising during the course of the action but
he may not impair the client's substantial rights or the cause of action
itself."55 The court, therefore, reversed a divorce judgment which was
entered pursuant to a stipulation, made over the client's express objec-
tion, that a judge who had not presided over the trial could decide the
case on the written record. The Court stated that "the right of a party
to have the trier of fact observe his demeanor, and that of his adver-
sary and other witnesses.... is so crucial to a party's cause of action
that an attorney cannot be permitted to waive by stipulation such
right as to all the testimony in a trial when the stipulation is contrary
to the express wishes of his client."56
It has proven difficult for courts to draw the line between routine57
lawyers negligently, failed to explain a settlement agreement to her, and coerced
her into accepting it).
53. Lockette v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1987)(defendant
failed to show that it was prejudiced during the one day between the day on
which the settlement was agreed and the day on which it learned that plaintiff
had rejected the settlement); Robinson v. Hiles, 119 Cal. App. 2d 666, 672,260 P.2d
194, 197-98 (1953); McAllister v. Hayes, 165 IMI. App. 3d 426, 428, 519 N.E.2d 71, 72
(1988); Coates v. Drake, 131 Mich. App. 687, 697, 346 N.W.2d 858, 862 (1984)(de-
fendant did not show any prejudice even though one year lapsed between dismis-
sal order and motion to vacate); Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 68,119
N.W.2d 114, 117 (1963). Cf. In re Marriage of Kaufman, 101 Cal. App. 3d 147,150-
51,161 Cal. Rptr. 538, 540 (1980) (husband's motion 21/2 years later to correct cleri-
cal errors to conform judgment to the terms of stipulation entered into in court
was granted because the husband acted as soon as he learned of the errors and
the lawyers lacked authority to modify terms of the court ordered judgment).
54. 70 Cal. 2d 272, 449 P.2d 760, 74 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969).
55. Id. at 276, 449 P.2d at 762, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 546. E.g., a defendant's lawyer's oral
stipulation in a pretrial conference that the evidence against plaintiff on a cross-
complaint and on the affirmative defenses was meager and that summary judg-
ment should be granted in the future was void unless made with his client's con-
sent. Roscoe Moss Co. v. Roggero, 246 Cal. App. 2d 781, 786-87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 911,
914-15 (1966).
56. Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal. 2d 272, 278-79, 449 P.2d 760, 764, 74 Cal. Rptr. 544, 548
(1969).
57. In her concurring opinion in Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d, 396, 410-11,
696 P.2d 645,654-55,212 Cal. Rptr. 151,160-61 (1985)(Bird, C.J., concurring), Chief
Justice Bird defined the difference as one between "decisions affecting important,
substantial rights and decisions on routine matters," whether they are procedural
or substantive. Thus the client must be involved in any decision which affects
these rights, such as waiving the right to a jury trial.
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and substantial procedural rights. 8 To compound the problem, deci-
sions in various jurisdictions are difficult to reconcile. For example,
the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a lawyer's authority to enter
into the same kind of stipulation disapproved of in Linsk.59 In con-
trast, since Linsk, the California Court has gone even further to reject
an attorney's authority to bind a client in areas affecting substantial
procedural rights.
In Linsk, the lawyer lacked both actual and apparent authority be-
cause the client made it clear to both the judge who accepted the stipu-
lation and the attorneys that she opposed the procedure.6 0 However,
in a more recent decision, Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., the same court
ruled that a lawyer lacked both implied and apparent authority to sub-
ject his client to binding arbitration, even if the opposing attorney was
unaware of the client's objections. 61 The Court reiterated that implied
58. The cases contain many examples of procedural steps that implicate a client's
substantial rights. E.g., a county district attorney has no authority to enter into a
stipulated judgment with a nursing homes operator which precluded the state
attorney general, the Department of Health, and other district attorneys from
performing their statutory enforcement duties. People v. Hy-Lond Enters., Inc.,
93 Cal. App. 3d 734, 747, 155 Cal. Rptr. 880, 887 (1979). A lawyer cannot stipulate
away his client's lien rights on the judgment which were its only interest in the
litigation. Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall Co., 235 Cal. App. 2d 484, 491, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 454, 458 (1965). A lawyer lacks authority to stipulate to waive a statutory
defense which would be a complete bar to plaintiff's action. De Long v. Owsley's
Ex'x, 308 Ky. 128, 130, 213 S.W.2d 806, 807 (1948). The court upheld the client's
decision to knowingly and deliberately waive her claim for present alimony, but
to request that the issue be held open in case she became disabled in the future,
even though her lawyer continued to insist on immediate alimony. Turrisi v.
Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 520-21, 520 A.2d 1080, 1082-83 (1987). In a landlord-tenant
action, a lawyer has no authority to waive in a letter the plaintiff's claim for rent.
Gordon v. Town of Esopus, 107 A.D.2d 114, 116, 486 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (1985). A
stipulation, entered into by the defendant's lawyer that a judgment for plaintiff
would be a "landlord's lien" on half of defendant's livestock, was invalidated on
the grounds that, even though it was procedural, it also surrendered a substantial
right because under the law the plaintiff was not entitled to that kind of lien.
Noska v. Mills, 141 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). See also Fresno City
High School Dist. v. Dillon, 34 Cal. App. 2d 637, 94 P.2d 86 (1939).
59. Gasior v. Wentz, 89 N.W.2d 886, 889-90 (ND. 1958). The court ruled that a lawyer
has procedural authority to bind away the rights of his client, and the stipulation
was not prejudicial to any substantial right of plaintiff. The court apparently did
not believe the plaintiff's statement that he was unaware of the stipulation, in
part, because the plaintiff waited until after the new judge ruled to voice his
objection.
60. Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal. 2d 272, 279, 449 P.2d 760, 764, 74 Cal. Rptr. 544, 548 (1969).
See also Brucar v. Rubin, 638 F.2d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1980)(client's objection in
open court to a particular judge presiding at a contempt hearing in light of her
lawyer's silence preserved the client's rights to assert a transfer for prejudice
motion).
61. 38 Cal. 3d 396, 407, 696 P.2d 645, 652, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151, 158 (1985). Since the
client had told her attorney beforehand that she would not agree to binding arbi-
tration, the lawyer lacked express authority. Id. at 399, 696 P.2d at 647, 212 Cal.
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authority covers only tactical or procedural matters.62
In analyzing apparent authority,63 the Court ruled that it made no
difference that the opposing attorney was unaware of the client's ob-
jection because "in this case the lack of justifiable reliance is clear."64
The stipulation to arbitrate waived substantial rights by eliminating
the chance for a judicial trial, providing for the opposing party's uni-
lateral choice of the arbitrator, limiting damages to $15,000, and entail-
ing all but minimal judicial review. The mere hiring of a lawyer to
engage in litigation does not enlarge his authority to bind a client to an
agreement with such substantial consequences.63 For these reasons
the opposing attorney could not assume that the lawyer had the au-
thority to bind his client to mandatory arbitration. Some procedural
matters may be so important as to be treated as "substantive". Thus,
they are beyond the scope of the lawyer's implied authority.
Just as clients have authority to decide whether to exercise impor-
tant rights, they also have authority over stipulations which determine
the major issues in litigation. For instance, a defendant's attorney did
not have authority, without informing the client or obtaining his con-
sent, to stipulate to vicarious liability or to the extent of the plaintiff's
injuries.66 Accordingly, courts may relieve the client of his lawyer's
admissions against the client's interests made in the course of litiga-
tion because they are outside the lawyer's implied or incidental au-
thority.67 Moreover, stipulations which affect the client's cause of
Rptr. at 153. Moreover, the lawyer was apparently unaware that he had agreed to
binding arbitration, and the client moved to set aside the stipulation as soon as
she learned about it. Id. at 400, 696 P.2d at 647, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
62. Id. at 404, 696 P.2d at 650, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
63. Apparent authority is created, and its scope defined, by the acts of the principal in
placing the agent in such a position that he appears to have the authority which
he claims or exercises. Id. at 406, 696 P.2d at 650, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
64. Id. at 408, 696 P.2d at 652, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
65. Id. at 407-08, 696 P.2d at 652, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 158. In a case cited by the concur-
ring opinion in Blanton, the Washington Supreme Court agreed that withdrawing
a demand for a jury trial without the client's consent was invalid because the
right to a jury is a substantial right. Graves v. P.J. Taggares Co., 94 Wash. 2d 298,
305, 616 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1980). The court of appeals that decided this case at a
lower level noted that the withdrawal of the demand for a jury without the con-
sent of the client was, in this case, of constitutional dimensions. Graves v. P.J.
Taggares Co., 25 Wash. App. 118, 125-26, 605 P.2d 348, 353 (1980). Contra Powell
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 166 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Shores Co. v. Iowa
Chem. Co., 222 Iowa 347,268 N.W. 581 (1936); and McLyman v. Miller, 52 R.I. 374,
161 A. 111 (1932), in which the lawyer's procedural authority to waive a jury was
upheld.
66. Graves v. P. J. Taggares Co., 94 Wash. 2d 298, 305, 616 P.2d 1223, 1228 (1980).
67. E.g., Vaccaro v. ALCOA S.S. Co., Inc., 405 F.2d 1133,1137 (2d Cir. 1958)(excluding
plaintiff's doctor's handwritten notes of a meeting with plaintiff's lawyer in
which the lawyer made a statement that would have shown that defendant was
not liable for the accident, because a lawyer's conversation with his client's doctor
was not made in the "management of the litigation."); Wieder v. Towmotor Corp.,
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action and which are entered into by mistake, either by a lawyer6S or
with the opposing party,69 may be set aside if it is possible to restore or
maintain the status quo.
Finally clients have authority over other procedural choices which
involve their substantive rights. For example, a lawyer does not have
plenary power to accept service of process on behalf of a client unless
the client expressly appoints the lawyer as his agent or the lawyer has
apparent authority, based on the client's actions.7 0 If a strategy deci-
sion involves a potential conflict of interest between a lawyer and a
client, then the lawyer must specifically advise his client of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the alternative strategies and obtain his
consent to pursue a particular strategy which may benefit the lawyer
more than the client.71
3. Tactical Decisions as Procedure
In contrast to those stipulations which deal with the client's impor-
tant rights or the substance of the client's claim, tactical decisions are
one class of procedural matters that fall within the scope of the law-
yer's special expertise. The lawyer has implied authority to manage
568 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1983)(in a closing argument plaintiff's lawyer's
statement that a third party "caused this accident" was not an unequivocal admis-
sion relieving defendant of liability when analyzed in light of the lawyer's argu-
ment about proximate cause); Price v. McComish, 22 Cal. App. 2d 92, 99, 70 P.2d
978, 982 (1937)(plaintiff's attorney's oral statement that his client would be satis-
fied with nominal damages in his favor was not binding on client, even when
made in open court in the presence of the client because it affected the subject
matter of the dispute); Couch v. Landers, 316 S.W.2d 588,593 (Mo. 1958)(a defense
lawyer's statement in a motion to dismiss that "this defendant stands ready and
has always stood ready ... to pay the court costs herein involved and the sum of
$14,000 to plaintiff.... ." is not binding on his client because he did not have the
implied or apparent authority to acknowledge his client's debt); Estabrook v.
American Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 127 N.H. 162, 180, 498 A.2d 741,752 (1985)(coun-
sel's statement made in asking a question in a deposition was not an admission
binding on his client).
68. Graen's Mens Wear, Inc. v. Stille-Pierce Agency, 329 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Iowa
1983)(A defense lawyer stipulated to the admission of an insurance policy, but
failed to examine it. At trial it was learned that the policy included theft cover-
age which the plaintiff had never previously contended it covered. The appellate
court ruled that the trial court would have been justified in setting aside the stip-
ulation based on surprise.).
69. In Re Estate of Frutiger, 29 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 272 N.E.2d 543, 546, 324 N.Y.S.2d 36,
41 (1971)(objectors to a will could withdraw stipulated waivers of notice and con-
sents to probate, signed in front of the executor and his lawyer, but not filed or
revealed by the proponent to the objectors' lawyers for 32 months).
70. Wilson v. Eddy, 2 Cal. App. 3d 617, 618, 82 Cal. Rptr. 826, 828-29 (1969).
71. Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424, 438, 709 P.2d 469, 478-79, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666, 676
(1985)(lawyer must inform the client of the consequences of choosing between
different causes of action: one which limits recovery, but also limits contingency
fees, and one with unlimited recovery, but unlimited contingency fees).
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the lawsuit, and a client does not have the right to control the way the
lawyer conducts litigation.
"The trial attorney is in full charge of the client's cause or defense.
When representing the defendant the attorney must determine in the
first instance what defenses shall be averred and what potential ones
shall be omitted. At the trial the attorney must have and exercise dis-
cretion to make such tactical decisions as the exigencies of the combat
may dictate."7 2 The attorney has the legal knowledge and skill that
must be consulted in that connection.
Consequently, strategy decisions made by a lawyer in the course of
litigation are generally immune from the client's subsequent attack on
appeal. A client may have a malpractice claim because of the lawyer's
asserted failure to exercise the requisite skill or care in handling the
trial of an action.7 3 However, this failure does not give the client the
basis to overturn an unfavorable judgment because the lawyer acted
outside his authority.74
72. Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 787, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 (1962)(up-
holding a lawyer's implied authority to withdraw a defense from the jury's con-
sideration during his closing argument even though the client alleged that it was
made without requesting authority from client). The court in First Am. Bank &
Trust Co. v. George, 239 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1976) described the lawyer's authority
as follows, "counsel owes to the courts... a duty to exercise an informed and
professional restraint in raising and litigating issues which are either without
merit or barely arguable and without prospect of success." Id. at 288-89. See also
Schleiger v. Schleiger, 137 Colo. 239, 324 P.2d 370 (1958)(waiver by counsel of
request to have court reporter transcribe proceedings within his implied author-
ity as a procedural choice in the course of litigation, even though client alleged
that she did not expressly enter into the waiver and she could not use the tran-
script to show that the judge had not ruled on all issues before the court); Good-
man v. Aero Enters., a Div. of ARA Servs., 469 So. 2d 835, 837 (FI. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)(employee's lawyer's stipulation that the losing party would pay attorney's
fees upheld even though the controlling statute provided that only an employer
who did not prevail would be liable for fees); Grocery & Food Warehousemen
Local Union No. 635 v. Kroger Co., 364 Pa. 195, 197, 70 A.2d 218, 219 (1950)(law-
yer's implied plenary authority included authority to stipulate that court deter-
mine issues on pleadings).
73. Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 788, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 (1962).
74. Bury v. McIntosh, 540 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1976)(rejecting plaintiff's claim that
his lawyer conspired with defense attorneys to keep favorable evidence away
from jury); Kim v. Orellana, 145 Cal. App. 3d 1024,1026-27,193 Cal. Rptr. 827,828-
29 (1983)(the court rejected the client's appeal in which he claimed that he was
denied a fair trial due to his attorney's misconduct during the trial); In re Mar-
riage of Wipson, 113 Cal. App. 3d 136, 144, 169 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (1980)(lawyer's
ineffective negotiation strategy was not grounds to set aside interlocutory judg-
ment). See also Mekdeci ex rel Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Laboratories, 711 F.2d
1510, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1983)(rejecting the proposition that ineffective counsel
was grounds for a new trial in a civil matter); Rosa v. Oliveira, 115 R.I. 277, 287,
342 A.2d 601, 606 (1975)(rejecting the client's complaints that he was denied due
process because of the various procedural steps taken by his counsel). However,
ineffective assistance of counsel supports a client's motion for a new trial in civil
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Courts have upheld a great variety of tactical decisions made by
lawyers in the face of subsequent attacks by clients who alleged that
the decisions were made without their authority.7 5 A lawyer can stip-
ulate to withdraw a defense pleaded in an answer.76 Lawyers have the
authority to decide which witnesses to call 77 or to stipulate that the
testimony of one witness would be the same as a previous witness.78
Similarly, a lawyer can stipulate that a matter need not be tried be-
cause it will be determined by other pending test cases. 79 A lawyer
also has the implied authority to ask for a jury trial over the client's
objections0 or to stipulate that certain facts are undisputed,81 that a
certain issue is dispositive and how to resolve it,82 or that evidence is
admissible83 Since the lawyer is the client's agent, his verification of a
paternity actions because the client has a right to counsel in such actions. Banks
v. Randle, 337 Pa. Super. 197, 486 A.2d 974 (1984).
Some states reject a cause of action for negligence in the attorney's choice of
trial tactics or conduct of the matter (e.g., seeking a change of venue or transcrib-
ing depositions) because of the lawyer's higher duty to the court and truth and
justice. Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
75. See, e.g., Valley Line Co. v. Ryan, 771 F.2d 366, 376 (8th Cir. 1985)(upholding the
lawyer's stipulations regarding jurisdiction and limitations on damages in a fed-
eral admiralty action). In Tushinksy v. Arnold, 195 Cal. App. 3d 666, 241 Cal.
Rptr. 103 (1987), a lawyer filed a petition for a restraining order under the Do-
mestic Violence Prevention Act against the client's husband based on the client's
false allegations that the husband was sexually abusing their child. Based on the
petition, the husband was then prosecuted for child molestation. Had the lawyer
filed the petition in the domestic relations court, no such criminal prosecution
would have followed. The court held that the lawyer was not liable for any dam-
ages to the client for violating the client's instructions to do nothing that would
result in the husband's criminal prosecution. The lawyer followed the law's pri-
mary goal in child abuse cases: to protect the child. Id. at 674, 241 Cal. Rptr. at
108.
76. Thomas v. Poole, 45 N.C. App. 260, 282 S.E.2d 515 (1981).
77. Nahhas v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 192 Cal. App. 2d 145, 146, 13 Cal. Rptr. 299,
300 (1961).
78. Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 120 Cal. App. 2d, 685,695,262 P.2d 95, 101-
02 (1953).
79. Hillman v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1982).
80. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 105-08, 81
P.2d 913, 917 (1938). In contrast to Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396,696
P.2d 645, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985), one old decision holds that a lawyer has the
authority to stipulate to arbitration. Holst v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 117
Or. 370, 244 P. 319 (1926). Another case holds that a lawyer has incidental author-
ity to waive a jury trial, especially because the client waited six months to take
any action to set aside the stipulation. Shores Co. v. Iowa Chem. Co., 222 Iowa
347, 351, 268 N.W. 581, 583 (1936).
81. Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Serv. Inc., 263 F.2d 948, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1959); United
States v. State of Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703, 712 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Kohr v. Kohr, 216
Cal App. 2d 516, 519, 31 Cal. Rptr. 85, 86 (1963).
82. Bauer v. Ham, 223 Va. 31, 36-37, 286 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1982).
83. Tyler v. King, 344 Pa. Super. 78, 496 A.2d 16 (1985).
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pleading or execution of an affidavit is the same as the cient'ss 4 A
lawyer can extend orally the time in which an answer must be filed.85
Even tactical stipulations that work to the client's detriment are
frequently upheld as being within the lawyer's implied authority. For
example, on cross-motions for summary judgment, when the plain-
tiff's lawyer entered into a stipulation accepting the defendants' state-
ment of uncontested facts, the stipulation was binding, and summary
judgment granted to the defendants was upheld.86 Similarly, a lawyer
can bind a client to allow and pay for a site inspection of the client's
land as a procedural step in a dispute about riparian rights.8 7
Courts have generally upheld the wide implied authority of law-
yers in civil litigation matters to take routine steps without consulting
their clients. In contrast, decisions that involve important procedural
rights or substantive matters are reserved to the client. The next sec-
tion will discuss the ways in which the lawyer's procedural authority
may negatively affect the client's substantive claim.
C. Consequences of the Lawyer's Procedural Errors
The lawyer's use or abuse of implied authority to control the proce-
dural aspects of litigation can adversely affect a client's complaint or
defense.88 As the client's agent, the lawyer has the power to bind the
client, and the lawyer's negligent acts in handling litigation are im-
puted to his client.8 9 Thus, even though the client need not be con-
sulted on procedural matters, he, as the principal, may bear the brunt
of his agent/lawyer's procedural mistakes.9 0 These mistakes may
84. Massey v. Educators Inv. Corp. of Ala., 420 So. 2d 77,78 (Ala. 1982)(lawyer's affi-
davit that client had not violated any aspect of consumer act met statutory re-
quirements because the lawyer had the implied authority to execute affidavits);
Beverly Bank v. Coleman Air Transp., 134 M. App. 3d 699, 704-05, 481 N.E.2d 54,
57 (1985)(answer to a complaint verified by the attorney and admitting the exist-
ence of a personal guarantee was binding on the client even though the client
alleged that he had never read the answer nor been consulted about it).
85. La Marque v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., 120 A.D.2d 572, 502 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986).
86. Hayman v. Block, 176 Cal. App. 3d 629, 634-35, 222 Cal. Rptr. 293, 295-96 (1986).
87. Mason v. Simmons, 114 A.D.2d 622, 623, 494 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (1985).
88. E.g., Wei v. Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1985)(the lawyer's inadvertence in not
serving the complaint because he did not calendar the date was not good cause for
failing to comply with the 120 day limit mandated by FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j), and the
complaint was dismissed).
89. Martin v. Cook, 68 Cal. App. 3d 799, 137 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1977). In Martin, the
lawyer misunderstood a term in a stipulation which waived the statutory two
year period in which to bring a matter to trial, but not the five year period con-
tained in another subsection of the same statute. This error did not provide
grounds for the client to avoid dismissal of the action at the end of the five years
for mistake or excusable neglect. Id. at 809-10, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
90. Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 394, 471 A.2d 395, 403 (1984)("Failure to call
witnesses, failure to inform defendants of the date of a hearing, failure to object
to a directed verdict, failure to file timely motions are all careless mistakes evi-
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arise in a host of areas such as dismissals, general dilatoriness, failure
to prosecute or defend, discovery, and admissions.
Courts have upheld the lawyer's authority to dismiss a client's ac-
tion. Because a dismissal with prejudice terminates a lawsuit and is
tantamount to a substantive decision, a plaintiff's lawyer typically
must have express authority to take this step. Nevertheless, some
cases have recognized a presumption that a client has given a lawyer
the express authority to enter such a dismissal. 91 The burden then
shifts to the client to prove lack of authority.92 Likewise, even if a
defendant objects to filing a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution,
the lawyer has the authority to make this procedural motion without
the client's approval, particularly if the court suspects collusion be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. 93
Just as the lawyer can deliberately end the client's action without
his approval, the lawyer's procedural misconduct can also lead inad-
vertently to the same result. In affirming the dismissal of a case be-
cause of the lawyer's general dilatoriness and in particular his failure
to appear at a pre-trial conference, the United States Supreme Court
wrote in Link v. Wabash Railroad, that there was no merit to the con-
tention that dismissal of the petitioner's claim because of his counsel's
unexcused conduct imposed an unjust penalty on the client.94 The
Link court added that the trial court's power to dismiss a case for fail-
ure to prosecute is necessary in order to prevent undue delays and to
avoid congestion in court calendars.95
dencing a lack of proper diligence." These actions were not "excusable neglect"
entitling the clients to relief under the appropriate rule).
91. Greenhill v. Crabtree, 45 N.C. App. 49, 52, 262 S.E.2d 315 (1980); Gagnon Co., Inc.
v. Nevada Desert Inn, Inc., 45 Cal. 2d 448, 289 P.2d 466 (1955).
92. Greenhill v. Crabtree, 45 N.C. App. 49, 52, 262 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1980).
93. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 99 Cal. App. 3d 587, 595-96, 160 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582 (1979).
94. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). The Court stated,
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the ac-
tion, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions
of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsis-
tent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is
deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have
"notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney."
Id. at 633-34 (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)).
95. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 at 629-30 (1962). See also Chira v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1980) where the court, in affirming the dis-
missal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to prosecute and complete discovery,
stated,
[i]t is with reluctance that an appellate court will approve a dismissal
with prejudice. But fairness to other litigants, whether in the same case
or merely in the same court (as competitors for scarce judicial re-
sources), requires us to affirm and endorse the district court's action
here. Burgeoning filings and crowded calendars have shorn courts of the
luxury of tolerating procrastination.
Id. at 668.
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The agency principle that each party is considered to have "notice
of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney" 96 is
applied in other circumstances, to the client's detriment. For exam-
ple, in determining when a statute of limitations began to run, a client
was charged with knowledge of all facts that a lawyer learned in the
course of his investigation of the client's case.97 Service of a judgment
on a lawyer may be sufficient to bind the client to its terms.98 A law-
yer's receipt of a notice of a procedure for concluding a trial was like-
wise binding on the client.99 Finally, a second lawyer's failure to
investigate the client's status in a lawsuit was imputed as the client's
ratification of the unauthorized acts that a first lawyer took on behalf
of the same client.100
96. Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879).
97. Owens v. Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, LTEE., 656 F. Supp. 981, 983 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (the statute of limitations for an asbestos-related personal injury matter be-
gan to run when the worker's compensation lawyer first received the medical
diagnosis of asbestos-related condition, even if the client never learned of the di-
agnosis until nine months later); Clark Equip. Co. v. Wheat, 92 Cal. App. 3d 503,
527-28, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874, 886-87 (1979)(client was imputed with the lawyer's
knowledge that the defendant did not have possession of certain machinery that
was the subject of a replevin action; consequently the lawyer's seeking a con-
tempt order against this defendant gave rise to a cause of action for abuse of pro-
cess against both the lawyer and the client). But cf. Palmer v. Ted Stevens
Honda, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d 530, 539, 238 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368 (1987)(client is not
vicariously libel for the lawyer's tortious litigation strategy merely for hiring the
lawyer, the opposing party must show that the client was actively involved in the
pretrial litigation strategy).
98. NLRB v. Sequoia Dist. Council of Carpenters, 568 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1977)(at
a hearing on a contempt citation, the union officers were bound by the judgment's
terms when it was served on the union's lawyer).
99. Townsend v. Gray Line Bus Co., 767 F.2d 11,18 (1st Cir. 1985)(when the opposing
counsel mailed a notice to the attorney of record that a new judge would decide
the matter on the transcript and exhibits from proceedings held before a de-
ceased judge, the notice was binding on the client).
However, courts have been more sympathetic to clients in employment dis-
crimination matters, interpreting the remedial nature of civil rights statutes to
require that the client, not his attorney, must receive personal notice of adverse
decisions before the appeals period begins to run. Brown v. Nat'l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin, 673 F.2d 544 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Cooper v. Lewis, 644 F.2d 1077 (5th
Cir. 1981).
100. Sei Corp. v. Norton & Co., 631 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1986). In Sei, three weeks
before trial the client was informed by a lawyer that he was representing him in a
lawsuit without his authority. At that time the client contacted his own counsel
and informed the counsel of the lawsuit. His counsel failed to inform the first
lawyer, plaintiff, or the court that the first lawyer had had no authority to accept
service of process or file an answer on behalf of the client or to make admissions
affecting his liability until the third day of a jury trial. The client was held to
have ratified the first lawyer's actions by the failure of his authorized counsel to
inform all parties and to ascertain the status of the case against him. Therefore
the client could not obtain relief from judgment entered against him, especially
where plaintiff justifiably relied on first lawyer's representations of his authority
to represent the client in proceeding to trial. Id. at 502-03.
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In affirming dismissals for failure to prosecute or defend, courts
point to a pattern of delay and dilatorinessol that should have put the
client on notice of the lawyer's poor behavior0 2 or that prejudiced the
opposing party's ability to comply with court rules.103 In other cir-
cumstances, the failure of a lawyer to file an answer was not sufficient
grounds to relieve a client from default or a motion for summary judg-
ment.10 4 Similarly, a client could not avoid a late filing penalty be-
101. Leblanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1985). In Leblanc, the petitioners' lawyers
filed frivolous claims and dilatory motions which were the grounds for the
Board's denying their request to reopen their case. The court noted that tactical
decisions can "ultimately fizzle and redound to the client's detriment." Id. at 694.
In Smith v. Stone, 308 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1962), plaintiff's lawyer failed to serve all
defendants, did not file opposition to summary judgment or a motion to dismiss,
sent a substitute attorney to request a continuance on the arguments on the mo-
tions and failed to contact the court about his alleged illness or vacation.
102. Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513 (5th Cir. 1985). There,
the court pointed out that the lawyer had missed nine deadlines, that lesser sanc-
tions had been tried, and that plaintiff contributed to the delay by beginning and
abandoning an appeal. Id. at 1521-22. In Townsend v. Gray Line Bus Co., 767 F.2d
11, 16-19 (1st Cir. 1985), defendant's lawyer stalled in discovery, failed to file pro-
posed conclusions of law, did not attend status conference when case was trans-
ferred to new judge after death of trial judge, failed to respond to notice about
how new judge would proceed and moved from Boston to California without clar-
ifying his relationship with his client. In Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634
F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1980), the court noted that the plaintiff was himself a lawyer
and could not shift all the blame on his attorney for delaying the litigation.
103. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). There the
court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the defendant
had to file a pretrial statement without plaintiff's answers to interrogatories and
without plaintiff's pre-trial statement, there was a pattern of dilatoriness, and the
defendant had a prima facie complete defense in the statute of limitations. In
limiting the application of the results in Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962),
this court laid out six factors to be considered in reviewing a trial court's discre-
tion in dismissing a case or refusing to lift a default: extent of the party's per-
sonal liability; prejudice to the adversary; a history of dilatoriness; whether the
attorney's conduct was willful or in bad faith; alternative sanctions; and meritori-
ousness of the claim. Id. at 868-70.
104. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973)(lawyer failed
to file an answer on behalf of his client or oppose a summary judgment because of
his agreement with counsel for a second defendant that the other client would
pay the obligation and the second lawyer would keep the first lawyer informed
about the status of the case); Transit Ads, Inc. v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 270
Cal. App. 2d 275, 75 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1969)(lawyer failed to file an answer because
of illness and failed to give co-counsel clear instructions after receiving continu-
ances from plaintiff's counsel); Delta Equip. and Constr. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co.,
186 So. 2d 454,458 (La. Ct. App. 1966)(a lawyer did not commit malpractice when
a default judgment was entered against his client after the lawyer, who was re-
tained by the client's worker's compensation carrier to defend a compensation
claim only, returned to the carrier a second lawsuit for wages attached to the
compensation claim without advising his client of the lawsuit because the lawyer
owed no duty to the client on the second lawsuit and had no authority to act on its
behalf); Union Storage & Transfer Co. v. Smith, 79 N.D. 605, 610-11, 58 N.W.2d
782, 786 (1953)(defendant bound by his lawyer's waiving a rule that a complaint
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cause he relied on his tax counsel to file the tax return in a timely
fashion.105
Failure to make discovery can also lead to severe repercussions for
a client.10 6 Dismissal of a complaint may follow the failure to comply
with discovery orders, 07 or a client may be precluded from offering
proof on a key issue which may be tantamount to dismissing the plain-
tiff's claim.' 08 Even alleging that the dismissal of a case was due to a
lawyer's willful failure to make discovery may not convince the court
to relieve the client of his poor choice of counsel. 0 9
Admissions by a lawyer in different procedural stages of litigation
may also bind the client even though the result may limit the client's
recovery. For example, a lawyer's admission in a letter written to op-
posing counsel that his client owes a certain sum has been held to be
must be filed within 20 days of service of summons and accepting service of the
complaint, since these stipulations were within lawyer's authority).
105. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985). This decision is partially based on the
need for a "bright-line" test in matters of filing tax returns where the burden is
placed on the taxpayer, not an agent, in order to have an efficient tax system. Id.
at 248. Even though the client supplied all the necessary records and periodically
checked with the lawyer as to the status of the return, he was still penalized for
his lawyer's late filing. Id. at 242-43.
106. E.g., in Tolliver v. Northrop Corp., 786 F.2d 316, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1986), the court
dismissed the action because the client failed to answer interrogatories or appear
for her deposition after the court personally ordered her to do so when she was
acting as her own attorney, and it denied her motion under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
even though she claimed that she had given a draft of her answers to a new attor-
ney, because she was responsible for the lawyer's misdeeds.
107. Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1980)(plaintiff, after a
court order to complete discovery and file pre-trial statement within six months,
did nothing, except to object to 120 questions in his deposition); Carroll v. Abbott
Laboratories, Inc., 32 Cal. 3d 892, 654 P.2d 775, 187 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1932)(plaintiff
in minor's personal injury matter failed to supply medical records or baby book
after two orders); Bell v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1985)(de-
fault entered against insurance company for failure to respond to interrogatories
despite client's assertion that it was unaware that either discovery had been
served or orders issued). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034 (West 1983) and
FED. P& Civ. P. 37.
108. Cine Forty-Second St. Theater v. Allied Artists Pictures, 602 F.2d 1062 (1979). In
Cine, the plaintiff was precluded from entering evidence as to damages even
though counsel committed "gross professional negligence" by failing to comply
with an order to answer interrogatories, because the client "was aware of every
aspect of discovery and intimately involved with the progress of the case." Id. at
1068 & n.10. In Schicchi v. J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 A.D.2d 509, 510-11, 472
N.Y.S.2d 718, 720-21 (1984), plaintiff's failure to respond to a request for a bill of
particulars due to a law office failure led to a preclusion order and dismissal; the
court held that this failure to respond indicated an intent to abandon the claim.
109. Bernstein v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 449,173 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1981). Dis-
missal of first action for willful failure to make discovery barred a second action
on the same claim. Id. at 451, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
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binding on the client.11o Similarly, a lawyer's factual admission in an
opening statement"1 l or his commitment to limit damages at a hearing
on a preliminary motion to stay proceedingsll2 have been binding on
clients as procedural matters within the scope of the lawyer's implied
authority.ll3
After a client chooses a lawyer to represent him in civil litigation,
the lawyer assumes authority over the procedural aspects of the repre-
sentation. Under this regime, the client has only limited control over
his lawyer's actions but, nevertheless, absorbs the potentially detri-
mental impact of the lawyer's behavior. Thus, strict adherence to this
agency model may severely prejudice the client. Following is a discus-
sion of those situations where the courts have abandoned or distorted
the agency model to either protect the client or further other
objectives.
III. DISTORTION AND ABANDONMENT OF THE AGENCY
MODEL IN PRACTICE
The agency model and its allocation of authority pursuant to the
substance/procedure line has frequently proven unacceptable in prac-
tice. In some instances dissatisfaction with the model has led to its
manipulation and distortion by the courts. In other cases the model
has been overtly abandoned. As a result, courts frequently enforce
settlement agreements over the client's objections. In other situations
courts have relieved clients of their lawyers procedural errors.
A. Upholding Settlement Agreements
Even though the decision to settle is the prototype substantive de-
110. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union Local No. 162 v. Glasgow Theaters, Inc., 6
Cal. App. 3d 395, 404-05, 86 Cal. Rptr. 33, 39 (1970).
111. McLhinney v. Lansdell Corp. of Maryland, 254 Md. 7, 10-12, 254 A.2d 177, 179
(1969)(defense attorney's admissions in his opening statement that defendant's
employee was driving defendant's truck in the course of his employment when
the accident occurred were admissions favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff did not
have to put on evidence on these issues).
112. McCoy v. McSorley, 119 Ga. App. 603, 168 S.E.2d 202 (1969)(in a personal injury
action against a serviceman seeking a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act, a statement made by plaintiff's counsel in open court that plaintiff
would not seek judgment for any amount above serviceman's liability policy was
binding on the plaintiff).
113. See Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 147 Ariz. 534, 711 P.2d 1207 (1985)(law-
yer's statement during direct examination of plaintiff that he was not pursuing an
assault claim was binding on his client); Worth v. Douglas Production Credit
Ass'n, 173 Ga. App. 808, 328 S.E.2d 421 (1985)(at conclusion of hearing on confir-
mation of sale of real property, lawyer waived contentions as to validity of sale
and preserved only issues of value); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So. 2d
898 (Miss. 1981)(lawyer's statement when he rested his case that he was not pur-
suing assault claim was binding on his client).
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cision supposedly reserved to the client, many cases uphold settle-
ments despite later complaints by clients who claim that their
attorneys acted beyond the scope of their authority. In support of
these decisions, courts typically cite strong judicial policies favoring
voluntary settlement of lawsuits "to get money into the hands of a
victim of tortious conduct" and "to reduce the burden on and expense
of maintaining courts."- 4 Some decisions apply traditional authority
principles to find a rationale for upholding a settlement agreement.
Other cases have completely abandoned the agency model.
1. Distortion of the Agency Model
In some circumstances, courts are suspicious of clients who seek to
withdraw from settlements because the settlement turns out to be less
advantageous than they expected.n5 In other situations courts con-
sider the harm to the interests of other parties who would be forced to
continue an action they thought was settled.fl6
Courts sometimes uphold settlement agreements by finding that,
despite a client's protests to the contrary, express authority to settle
was given to the lawyer. By so finding, the courts recognize that set-
tlement is a substantive matter within the client's realm of authority,
but that the authority was in fact properly delegated to the attorney.
A retainer agreement may grant express authority to the lawyer to
settle on the client's behalf, even when the client never personally
114. Rothman v. Fillette, 503 Pa. 259, 266-67, 469 A.2d 543, 546 (1983).
115. E.g., Mathewson Corp. v. Allied Marine Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 854 (1st Cir.
1987)(defendant bound to a settlement reached when plaintiff accepted defend-
ants offer after a Supreme Court decision which allegedly barred the claim be-
cause defendant's lawyer failed to put a time limit on the offer and each party
was a sophisticated entity represented by seasoned counsel); Worthy v. McKesson
Corp., 756 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1985)(client sought to withdraw from an oral
settlement in EEOC matter after consulting another attorney for "second opin-
ion"); Williams v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 484 F. Supp. 917, 923 (S.D. Fla.
1978)(client objected to an adverse ruling in an arbitration procedure held four
months after signing stipulation to arbitrate); Cohn v. Zarowitz, 501 A.2d 1235,
1238 (Del. 1985)(the plaintiff's interests as preferred stockholders were ade-
quately represented in settlement negotiations to end a class action lawsuit aimed
at stopping a merger and the agreement was fair to them).
116. Phelps v. Kozakar, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1078, 1083, 194 Cal. Rptr. 872, 875 (1983)(cli-
ent who settled lawsuit to further business interests of associate and defendant in
related lawsuit may not withdraw from the settlement); Argo Plastics Prods. Co.
v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio St. 3d 389, 391, 474 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1984)(defendant
may not set aside a settlement on the grounds that the defendant's attorney set-
tled for an amount vastly beyond his authority because to overturn the judgment
would only harm the plaintiffs); Cohen v. Goldman, 85 R.I. 434, 439-40, 132 A.2d
414,417 (1957)(client who hired lawyer and cloaked him with apparent authority
to settle should suffer the loss when the lawyer absconded with the settlement
payment rather than shift loss to the defendant by reopening the case).
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accepted the settlement and immediately repudiated it. 7 More typi-
cally, it is found that the client was consulted before the lawyer con-
tacted the opposing counsel 18 or during the settlement negotiations" 9
and understood the terms of the agreement without objecting. An-
other court found that a lawyer had authority to enter into a settle-
ment, in spite of the lawyer's own testimony that he lacked that
authority, because the client was participating and being kept in-
formed as the negotiations progressed. 20
When overriding a client's objections to a settlement, courts may
find a grant of express authority in the communication between the
lawyer and the client in the context of the particular relationship.121
For instance, where a corporate client hired an attorney to explore a
117. First Fed. Say. & Loan v. C.P.R. Constr., Inc., 70 Or. App. 296, 302, 689 P.2d 981,
984 (1984)(The language in a retainer agreement which granted the law firm the
authority "to execute all settlements as defendants would ourselves" was held to
expressly authorize the law firm to enter into a binding settlement. The court
enforced the agreement despite the fact one lawyer in the firm denied that he
told the lawyer who formally accepted the proposal that the clients had accepted
it).
118. Norberg v. Fitzgerald, 122 N.H. 1080, 1081-82, 453 A-2d 1301, 1302-03 (1982)(the
court rejected the client's testimony that she objected to the agreement by tele-
phone and in a letter as soon as she received a copy of the agreement).
119. Worthy v. McKesson Corp., 756 F.2d 1370,1372-74 (8th Cir. 1985)(A few days after
he agreed to it, the plaintiff objected to a settlement in the amount of the defend-
ant's offer and which his lawyer approved; the client had consulted another attor-
ney who told him the case "had possibilities"). Accord International Telemeter
Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp., 592 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1979)(lawyer kept clients
fully informed of the progress of the negotiations by sending copies of correspon-
dence which they failed to disavow); Haldeman v. Boise Cascade, 176 Cal. App. 3d
230, 233-34, 221 Cal. Rptr. 412,413-14 (1985)(The court rejected the client's claim
that in phone conversations during protracted settlement conferences, she did
not give her lawyer authority to settle for $9,500. Rather the trial court exercised
its discretion and believed her lawyer who testified that the client told him "to do
what you think is best".); Fox v. Wiener Laces, Inc., 105 Misc. 2d 672, 675-76, 432
N.Y.S.2d 811, 814 (1980)(The lawyer reached an agreement in a settlement con-
ference, read it to his client on the phone, and stated to the court and his adver-
sary that the client approved it without reservation. The lawyer then dictated it
into the record without referring to any additional conditions or terms. The
agreement was fully enforceable because the lawyer had both implied and ex-
press authority to settle and had not revealed the client's other conditions.); Fed-
eral Land Bank v. Sullivan, 430 N.W.2d 700,702 (S.D. 1988)(client failed to object
to offers of settlement contained in letters sent by its lawyer to opposing counsel
and copied to the client).
120. Hawk v. Biggio, 372 So. 2d 303, 304 (Ala. 1979).
121. E.g., in Smedley v. Temple Drilling Co., 782 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1986), the defend-
ant used a claims adjusting company to handle and settle claims against it, even
those in excess of deductible. When insurance was involved, the adjustors ob-
tained authority directly from insurer to settle. Additionally, the adjustors had a
trust account to pay deductible amounts and hired lawyer to represent defendant.
The court held that through this arrangement, the adjustor and its lawyer had
actual authority to settle without any further approval from the client. More-
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negotiated settlement of a lawsuit, the president, who was also board
chairman and 96% owner of the corporation, was held to have given
the lawyer express authority to settle when he dictated the terms of
the offer to the lawyer and told him that the board had originated and
approved the offer's terms. 22 If the client consented to the agree-
ment, courts are not sympathetic to an argument that the lawyer did
not adequately explain the terms of the agreement to the client. 23
Other decisions find implied authority from the client's behavior in
the particular situation. Where the client was unavailable to the law-
yer at the time the stipulation was reached and the lawyer acted to
protect his client's interests, the settlement was upheld from the cli-
over, the defendant gave express, specific, explicit instructions to settle such
cases. Id. at 1360.
There is no evidentiary problem in reaching these communications. A party
who attacks his own attorney's authority to settle impliedly waives the privilege
as to the very matter he puts in issue, otherwise the party could prevent facts
bearing on that authority from coming into evidence. Another rationale is that
settlement terms are designed to be communicated to other parties and therefore
fall under the larger exception to the privilege for third party communications.
Steinfeld v. Dworkin, 147 Vt. 341,343,515 A.2d 1051,1052 (1986). But see Webb v.
First Nat'l Bank, 711 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Mont. 1985)(Morrison, J., dissenting).
122. Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F. Supp. 923, 933 (D. Minn. 1982). See
also Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918 (Iowa 1985). In Dillon, the court
upheld a settlement of a worker's compensation claim because in closed session,
the city council gave its privately retained lawyer authority to settle the case for
up to $150,000 to be paid in installments. No other limits or conditions were
placed on this attorney. Moreover, the city corporate counsel and the mayor, a
lawyer, were present and they stated that the city would be bound if a settlement
was reached. Some councilman's statement that this was like labor negotiations,
iLe., that the attorney would come back to them with a figure, could not be under-
stood by the lawyer as a limit on his authority because he had never done labor
negotiations for them. However, the lawyer had no authority to add terms about
reimbursement for sick leave or continuing group health insurance to the agree-
ment, and those terms were deleted. Id. at 924-25.
123. Interspace, Inc. v. Morris, 650 F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(defendant could
not invalidate a settlement because his counsel gave him poor advice about the
effect on his personal liability of signing the consent judgment); Acheson v.
White, 195 Conn. 211, 217, 487 A.2d 197, 200 (1985)(client could not set aside set-
tlement on grounds that her consent was fatally tainted because of a conflict of
interest arising out of her lawyer's joint representation of a co-defendant and that
the attorney did not discuss possible defenses with her and discouraged her from
obtaining independent counsel); In re Marriage of Burkey, 36 Wash. App. 487,
675 P.2d 619 (194)(wife cannot vacate portions of marital property settlement
agreement on grounds of manifest injustice because her lawyer gave her errone-
ous advice about the valuation of the marital property).
Even if the agreement stands, the client may be able to sue the lawyer for
malpractice. E.g., Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 171 N.J. Super. 39, 51, 407 A.2d
1256,1261 (1979)(lawyer hired by the insurer committed malpractice by failing to
advise the insured of the possible implications and consequences of a dispute with
the insurer, including a probable conflict of interest for the lawyer, over the in-
sured's withdrawal of a grant of settlement authorization to the insurer).
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ent's attack. 2 4 For example, a client who was unavailable for trial and
told his lawyer to "do the best you can under the circumstances," gave
the lawyer implied authority to settle the matter.-2
Another group of decisions finds apparent or ostensible authority
in upholding settlements.126 Here the courts focus on the client's con-
duct that causes a reasonable third party to believe that the lawyer
had authority to enter into a settlement.'= In one such case,2  the
defendant retained a lawyer specifically to negotiate a settlement of a
patent infringement lawsuit.129 Even though express authority was
absent, the defendant was bound because the settlement was made
within the attorney's apparent authority, and the defendant's in-house
counsel did not deny or reject the agreement. 3 0
124. Sockloff v. Eden Point N. Condominiums, 421 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982)(defendant was out of the country on health matters and his lawyer stipu-
lated to judgment). Accord Brown v. Brown, 245 Ga. 511, 511-12, 265 S.E.2d 809,
810 (1980)(husband left state and instructed lawyer to continue to represent him
in divorce action); Bauer v. Lygren, 113 A.D.2d 913, 914, 493 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816
(1985)(personal injury plaintiff was out of town visiting relatives on date of pre-
trial conference); Brumberg v. Chunghai Chan, 25 Misc. 2d 312, 316-17, 204
N.Y.S.2d 315, 319 (1960)(tenant was out of the country and unavailable).
125. Sockloff v. Eden Point N. Condominiums, 421 So. 2d 716, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
126. "Under Georgia law, an attorney is cloaked with apparent authority to enter into
a binding agreement on behalf of a client ... only if the client had specifically
limited his attorney's authority to settle and the opposing attorneys were aware
of this limitation would the settlement agreement have been unenforceable."
Glazer v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 616 F.2d 167, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1980). There, the
court upheld a settlement agreement in an action involving disputed brokerage
commissions and defamation despite the substantial factual issue about the ex-
tent of authority the client had given the lawyer to negotiate. Id. at 168. Accord
Potomac Leasing v. First Nat. Bank, 180 Ga. App. 255, 348 S.E.2d 907 (1986).
While rejecting the notion that the mere hiring of an attorney implies the
authority to compromise his client's case, another court ruled that an opposing
party may justifiably rely on an attorney's apparent authority to settle if that
attorney was engaged as an agent to handle a particular matter and that agency
was not revoked. Cohen v. Goldman, 85 R.I. 434, 439, 132 A.2d 414, 417 (1957).
127. In re Paolino, 72 Bankr. 323, 329, aff'd, 75 Bankr. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1987)(lawyer
hired by debtor/husband had apparent authority to bind debtor/wife because the
husband made all the decisions regarding bankruptcy including the hiring of
counsel, the wife was aware that the lawyer was representing her, all the issues
were the same and she did nothing to communicate to the law firm or anyone else
that they did not represent her); United States Plywood Corp. v. Neidlinger, 41
N.J. 66,72,194 A.2d 730, 734 (1963)(the following facts raised the issue of whether
plaintiff's lawyer had apparent authority to settle a claim with defendant. plain-
tiff knew that a meeting had been specifically called to consider a settlement of
creditors' claims; it sent its lawyer- he acted throughout the meeting on its behalf;
he was appointed to the committee which took over the defendant's assets; and
plaintiff never questioned his connection with the committee).
128. Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F. Supp. 923 (D. Minn. 1982).
129. Id. at 933-34.
130. Id. Accord Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 774 F.2d 1320,
1322 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1985)(Plaintiff's lawyer had apparent
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Other types of client conduct can also create apparent authority.
Where a client hired a lawyer to represent it in a variety of claims
arising out of a single incident, it was held that a third party could
reasonably believe that the lawyer had authority to negotiate a settle-
ment on all claims related to the same incident.' 3 ' In another case,
apparent authority for a lawyer to agree not to enforce a judgment
against a defendant was created when the client introduced the de-
fendant to the client's lawyer and urged the third party's assistance in
a lawsuit. 3 2 Similarly, a judgment creditor could not simultaneously
file an appeal from a judgment and negotiate a settlement to fix the
authority to settle based on the following facts: plaintiff hired the lawyer and he
handled the case; he attended and took depositions, corresponded with counsel
for defendant, did discovery, and participated in all pretrial conferences and or-
ders. Applying Mississippi law, the court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden to overcome the presumption that their lawyer had the authority to set-
tle. Moreover, defendant justifiably relied on the offer based upon the lawyer's
previous actions on the plaintiff's behalf.); Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 231,
474 N.E.2d 1178,1182,485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (1984)(Plaintiff had imbued a lawyer
with apparent authority on which the defendant reasonably relied because: 1)
the lawyer had represented the client throughout the litigation; 2) he had en-
gaged in prior settlement negotiations for him; and 3) he appeared at the final
pretrial conference which by state rule represents that he has authority to bind
him. Moreover the attendance of the other plaintiff with two lawyers also en-
forced the appearance. Under such circumstances the lawyer or other client
should have spoken up if the lawyer's authority was limited.).
131. Capital Dredge and Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d 525, 530-31 (6th Cir.
1986). See also Smedley v. Temple Drilling Co., 782 F.2d 1357, 1361 (5th Cir.
1986)(defendant clothed its claims adjustor, who hired defendant's attorney, with
apparent authority by giving him general authority to settle without any limits
and by not handling the litigation itself); Main Line Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp., 298 F.2d 801, 803 (3d Cir. 1962)(counsel who had authority to
reach cash settlement also had apparent authority to waive claims for an injunc-
tion); In re Scott, 82 Bankr. 760,762 (E.D. Pa. 1988)(it was within scope of debtor's
attorney's authority to sign an addendum to a settlement agreement); Patterson
v. Southern Ry., 41 Ga. App. 94,95,151 S.E. 818,819 (1930)(where, in the course of
dealings over many years the lawyer handled and settled many cases for client
without any complaint and on his own authority, some of those cases being set-
tled for less than the full amount without specific authority and by consulting the
bookkeeper when the client was out of town, the client was bound by the lawyer's
negotiation and settlement of a case which was turned over to his lawyer without
any specific instruction other than to handle the claim).
132. Yanchor v. Kagan, 22 Cal. App. 3d 544,99 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1971). In Yanchor, when
a client encouraged a third party to cooperate with his attorney by bringing him
to his attorney's office and by urging him to be a witness in client's favor in ex-
change for an agreement that the client would not sue him, the third party could
justifiably believe that the client had authorized a written agreement, sent to him
by the lawyer, that the client would not enforce any judgment against him. Id. at
550, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 371. Accord Clark Equip. Co. v. Wheat, 92 Cal. App. 3d, 154
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1979)(client was held responsible for abuse of process when its
lawyer, acting with apparent authority, represented to a defendant that the client
was not seeking a judgment of replevin against him and the lawyer then pro-
ceeded to obtain a default judgment and contempt order against the defendant
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terms for payment of the judgment and then reject the settlement,
abandon the appeal, and enforce the judgment in such a manner as to
penalize the judgment debtor.33
Courts may bind the client because he acquiesced in the lawyer's
exercise of settling authority. For instance, in one case the client was
present when a settlement was read into the record in open court and
failed to object to it.134 Even if the client was not present at the time
the settlement was finally read into the record, the client may have
created apparent authority by allowing his lawyer to conclude negotia-
tions which were started when the client was present.1 35
The longer a client waits to challenge a settlement agreement, the
more likely a court is to find that he acquiesced to it. Waiting five
years, 3 6 three years, 37 two years, 36 one and one-half years, 3 9 one
year,140 ten months,141 eight months,142 three months,143 or even two
even though he knew that the defendant did not have possession of the item in
question).
133. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 291 11. App. 423, 436, 10 N.E.2d 46, 52
(1936). The court ordered the creditor to accept the settlement. Id.
134. In re Paolino, 78 Bankr. 85, 89-90 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Ha-
nosh Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 106 N.M. 705, 708, 749 P.2d 90, 93 (1988); Hallock v.
State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 231, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1181, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (1984); Al-
fonso v. Pollicino, 128 A.D.2d 576, 577, 512 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (1987).
135. Lynch v. Lynch, 122 A.D.2d 572, 574, 505 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (1986). There, a client
instructed his lawyer, who had represented him throughout the litigation, to
"let's get it on paper this afternoon." The lawyer had negotiated on the client's
behalf all morning at the courthouse on the day of the trial and then the client
left without revealing any limits on his lawyer's authority. The court upheld the
stipulation read into the record that afternoon. Accord Bella Vista Dev. Corp. v.
Estate of Birnbaum, 85 A.D.2d 891,891-92, 446 N.Y.S.2d 753,753 (1981)(upholding
an oral stipulation made in open court by the estate's lawyers who failed to state
that it was subject to the client's approval and made in the presence of the
nephew of the executor who was authorized to bind the estate).
136. Miller v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 52 Pa. Commw. 127, 128, 415 A.2d
709, 711 (1980). But cf Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d
525, 530 (6th Cir. 1986), in which a four year delay was not fatal to the client's
challenge if the client did not know that the settlement released all of its claims.
137. Bauer v. Lygren, 113 A.D.2d 913, 493 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1985).
138. Webb v. First Nat'l Bank, 711 P.2d 1352 (Mont. 1985). In Webb, the client ac-
cepted the benefits of the settlement of the first lawsuit (dismissal of the claim
against the client in exchange for a discounted payment of the obligation) before
bringing a second lawsuit for tortious interference with a contract arising out of
the same facts and alleging that the first settlement did not cover this claim. Id.
at 1354.
139. Williams v. International Assoc. of Machinists, 484 F. Supp. 917, 922 (S.D. Fla.
1978).
140. Continental Casualty v. Chrysler Constr. Co., 80 Misc. 2d 552, 363 N.Y.S.2d 258
(1975).
141. Klimas v. Mitrano, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 1004, 1005, 459 N.E.2d 1254, 1255-56 (1984).
142. Interspace Inc. v. Morris, 650 F. Supp. 107, 109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
143. Alfonso v. Policino, 128 A.D.2d 576, 512 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1987).
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months 44 to move to vacate a settlement may constitute proof of a
client's acceptance of a stipulation. A client's absence from court
when the stipulation was entered is often not a sufficient basis for
challenging the lawyer's authority where the client has delayed in at-
tacking the settlement. 45
Additionally, estoppel principles may bind a client to a settle-
ment.-46 A client will be estopped from denying that a settlement has
been reached if: (1) the client had knowledge of the settlement
reached by his lawyer; (2) acted in such a way that the other party
reasonably believed that he intended to be bound by it; (3) the other
party was unaware that the client did not want to be bound by it; and
(4) the other party relied on the client's conduct to its detriment. 4 7
For the purpose of estoppel, discontinuing discovery and investiga-
tion148 or allowing a trial date to pass in reliance on a settlement' 49
often constitutes the opposing party's change of position to its
detriment.
Closely related to the concepts of estoppel and acquiescence, ratifi-
144. Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 229, 474 NE.2d 1178, 1180, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513
(1984).
145. Brown v. Brown, 245 Ga. 511,265 S.E.2d 809 (1980)(husband waited at least a year
to question divorce decree and partially complied with its terms). Accord Bauer
v. Lygren, 113 A.D.2d 913,493 N.YS.2d 815 (1985)(personal injury plaintiff waited
three years from first consulting new attorney to challenge settlement entered
when she was out of town); Brumberg v. Chunghai Chan, 25 Misc. 2d 312, 204
N.Y.S.2d 315 (1960)(tenant waited seven months after settlement was entered,
four months after first learning about it, and one month after returning to the
country before filiig motion to vacate).
146. E.g., Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 104 IlM. App. 3d 630, 633, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1211
(1982)(client who silently stood by, allowed her attorney to negotiate on her be-
half, and heard the terms of the settlement read into the record, is estopped from
denying her lawyer's apparent authority); J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Dan-
ville, 122 N.H. 234,236-37,444 A.2d 493,494 (1982)("Absent manifest hardship to a
town, a good-faith settlement by town counsel in a zoning or subdivision case will
estop the town from later attempting to abrogate its terms." The town counsel
represented both the planning board and the board of selectmen in negotiating
the settlement. The court ruled that the settlement was within the counsel's au-
thority, and the town could not move to modify it.).
147. In re Gerry, 670 F. Supp. 276,280-83 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Accord Arizona Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Pace, 8 Ariz. App. 269, 272, 445 P.2d 471, 474 (1968)(An insurance
company was estopped to deny that it was bound by the actions of the attorney
which it retained to act on behalf of its insureds and was therefore obligated to
reimburse the insureds for the settlement they paid. While the attorney nomi-
nally represented the insured, he was hired by the insurer, kept insurer informed
of the litigation's progress, and the insureds were aware that he was protecting
insurer's interests. Thus, insureds were justified in assuming that he had appar-
ent authority to settle when he volunteered to negotiate on their behalf.).
148. In re Gerry, 670 F. Supp. 276, 282 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
149. Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 231, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1182, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514
(1984). Accord Carroll v. Ghidoni, 730 S.W.2d 280,284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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cation is an additional ground for upholding settlements.150 Even if
the court finds that the lawyer acted beyond his actual or implied au-
thority by giving up a substantial right of the client, a client who acts
on the stipulation and accepts its benefits may be barred from later
challenging the settlement.151 In a similar context, a client who rati-
fies an agreement by accepting payment pursuant to its terms cannot
then argue that she did not give her lawyer the authority to enter into
other terms of the agreement, such as waiving appeal, 5 2 making a
claim for fees' 53 , or demanding that the defendant furnish a declara-
tion that the settlement was for the policy limits.154
Ratification likewise prevents a client from first following a settle-
ment agreement and then denying his lawyer's authority when the
agreement later proves unsatisfactory. By adhering to its terms, the
client ratifies the agreement, even if it works to his detriment. For
example, if by stipulation a labor lawsuit is referred to arbitration and
the client loses the arbitration, he can not then disavow the settle-
ment.155 Similarly, if the client agreed to pay a stipulated amount by a
certain date, the client cannot latter claim that the lawyer had author-
ity as to the amount, but not as to the payment due date.156 In another
case, a client ratified a stipulation to settle a quiet title action by hold-
ing conferences with his lawyer about purchasing the disputed land
from the other owners, by following the lawyer's advice regarding
purchase, by having the lawyer make offers to the other owners, and
by not objecting to the stipulated judgment until after the attempts to
150. Edwards v. Born, 22 V.I. 426 (1986)(clients orally ratified a settlement reached by
their lawyer after the lawyer compared the settlement figure with their potential
recovery at trial and the lawyer thereafter wrote a letter to the clients memorial-
izing their understanding).
151. Smedley v. Temple Drilling Co., 782 F.2d 1357, 1361-62 (5th Cir. 1986)(defendant
accepted the benefit of the settlement by terminating its own payments to the
plaintiff until it learned that its insurer was insolvent); In re Paolino, 85 Bankr.
24, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1988)(debtor/wife waited one month to repudiate an agreement
entered in her husband's presence); City of Fresno v. Baboian, 52 Cal. App. 3d
752, 758-59, 125 Cal. Rptr. 332, 335 (1975); Webb v. First Nat'l Bank, 711 P.2d 1352,
1355 (Mont. 1985)(client accepted the following benefits: dismissal of action
against him and paying plaintiff a discounted amount on the claim); Rolfstad v.
Hanson, 221 N.W.2d 734, 736 (N.D. 1974)(client acquiesced over an extended pe-
riod of time with full knowledge of his lawyer's actions including- hiring another
lawyer to represent the client in a particular matter and the second lawyer stipu-
lating to the facts in the matter to avoid a prolonged trial).
152. In re Hatfield, 231 Kan. 427, 429, 646 P.2d 481, 483 (1982).
153. Miller v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 52 Pa. Commw. 127, 128, 415 A.2d
709, 711 (1980).
154. Olson v. Arnett, 113 Cal. App. 59, 169 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1980).
155. Williams v. International Assoc. of Machinists, 484 F. Supp. 917, 922 (S.D. Fla.
1978).
156. Zim Isr. Navigation Co. v. Special Carriers, Inc., 800 F.2d 1392, 1394 (5th Cir.
1986).
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purchase the land were unsuccessful and partition was ordered.157
2. Aband nment of the Agency Model
In some instances, when it is clear that a lawyer had no express or
apparent authority to settle, an attorney has been found to have im-
plied authority to bind a client to a settlement. Some jurisdictions
have abandoned the agency model and found the authority in the law-
yer-client relationship itself. In Georgia, for example, "[in] the ab-
sence of express restrictions upon the attorney's authority it may be
termed as plenary insofar as the court and the opposing parties are
concerned."158 A Georgia court upheld a settlement agreement de-
spite the client's assertion that he had no memory of authorizing his
attorney to accept a settlement because he was taking medication
which affected his mental capabilities.' 59 The same kind of wide-rang-
ing authority exists in South Carolina where the mere hiring of an
attorney gives the attorney implied authority to confess judgment in
the other party's favor.160
While no such implied plenary power exists in California, some
cases have held that there is a rebuttable presumption that the attor-
ney had authority to dismiss the client's action with prejudice.161
157. Petersen v. Petersen, 245 N.W.2d 285, 287-88 (N.D. 1976).
158. Shepherd v. Carlton's Nice Cars, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 749, 750, 256 S.E.2d 113, 115
(1979). Accord Wong v. Bailey, 752 F.2d 619, 621 (11th Cir. 1985)(Plaintiff's law-
yer entered into an oral agreement with defendant's lawyer that included a gen-
eral release. However, the lawyers could not later agree on language to preserve
plaintiff's rights against another potential defendant. Therefore, since the agree-
ment was governed by Georgia law the plaintiff was bound to the general release
because her lawyer had not raised this issue during the settlement negotiations.);
Bridges v. Bridges, 256 Ga. 348, 349-50, 349 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1986)(court cited the
principle, but held that the oral agreement was not enforceable because the law-
yers knew that the client had not agreed to one essential term of the settlement);
Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 251 Ga. 674, 676, 308 S.E.2d 544, 547
(1983)(Since Georgia lawyers have apparent authority to bind their clients to set-
tlements, this authority is plenary unless limited by the client and this limitation
must be communicated to the opposing side. Absent this communication, an op-
posing lawyer can deal with the lawyer as if dealing with client. Where there is
no challenge to the existence of the agreement or its terms, but only to the law-
yer's authority to enter into it, the client is bound even in absence of writing.).
See also GEORGIA SuPERIOR CoURT RULE 4.12, "an attorney of record has appar-
ent authority to enter into agreements on behalf of his client(s) in civil actions."
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3304 (Harrison 1986).
159. Shepherd v. Carlton's Nice Cars, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 749, 750, 256 S.E. 2d 113, 114
(1979). Accord Phoenix Properties of Atlanta, Inc. v. Umstead, 245 Ga. 172, 264
S.E.2d 8 (1980).
160. Lord Jeff Knitting Co., Inc. v. Mills, 281 S.C. 374, 376-77, 315 S.E.2d 377, 378
(1984)(upholding an attorney's consent to judgment over his client's objections
that he did not understand that he would be personally liable).
161. Ford v. State of California, 115 Cal App. 3d 507, 516, 172 Cal. Rptr. 162, 167
(1981)(citing Gagnon v. Nevada Desert Inn, Inc., 45 Cal. 2d 448, 289 P.2d 466
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Some jurisdictions presume that the attorney has the authority, and
require the client or moving party to overcome that presumption.162
In New York, a court rule which requires a lawyer attending a pre-
trial conferences to have full settlement authority creates implied au-
thority for a lawyer to bind the client if the lawyer does not reveal any
limits on his authority.163 In Alabama, an attorney is vested with au-
thority to bind his client in all matters that relate to the cause, includ-
ing the right to settle all questions involved in the case.164
B. Relief from the Lawyer's Procedural Choices
Other examples of overt abandonment of the agency model are
cases in which clients are granted relief from the effects of lawyers'
procedural errors. Even though the lawyer has authority over the
procedural aspects of litigation and, as the client's agent, a lawyer's
neglect is generally imputed to the client,165 the client or his lawyer
(1955)). Accord Phelps v. Kozakar, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1078,1082,194 Cal. Rptr. 872,
874 (1983). In Missouri, if the lawyer represents that he has authority to settle
and did settle with the opposing counsel, then his act of settling is presumed
prima facie to be authorized, and the client must prove lack of authority. Leffler
v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 612 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
162. Garabedian v. Allstates Eng'g Co., 811 F.2d 802, 803 (3d Cir. 1987); Turner v. Bur-
lington N.R.R., 771 F.2d 341, 346 (8th Cir. 1985)(client who challenged authority
of his lawyer to enter settlement had burden of proof); Surety Ins. Co. v. Wil-
liams, 729 F.2d 581,582-83 (8th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavat-
ing, Inc., 627 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1980); Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600
F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979); Coates v. Drake, 131 Mich. App. 687, 695, 346 N.E.2d
858, 862 (1984). But cf Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Patmon, 119 Mich. App. 772, 777,
327 N.W.2d 355, 358 (1982)(in motion to enter consent decree, plaintiff/moving
party must prove defense counsel had authority).
163. Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224,474 N.E.2d 1178, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1984)(uphold-
ing a settlement in an eminent domain proceeding). Accord Continental Cas. Co.
v. Chrysler Constr. Co., 80 Misc. 2d 552, 554, 363 N.Y.S.2d 258, 261 (1975)(uphold-
ing a settlement in a construction bond dispute over the client's objection because
of prejudice to the other party and the court's need to control congestion and its
own procedures); DiRusso v. Grant, 28 A.D.2d 847, 281 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1967)(plain-
tiffs' motion to restore a negligence action to the calendar based on their refusal
to accept a settlement that their lawyer negotiated at a pretrial conference was
denied because the clients did not appear for conference, impliedly acknowledg-
ing their lawyer's authority to bind them, and the lawyer never made known that
his authority was at all limited).
164. ALA. CoVE § 34-3-21 (1975). Accord King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 1023,
1026 (Ala. 1987)(upholding a settlement agreement, based on evidence that de-
fendant only inquired about a change in terms and did not reject the offer made
by plaintiffs' attorney); Reeves v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 457 So. 2d 402, 404
(Ala. 1984)(upholding a settlement, made on the first day of trial in the client's
presence and in an amount in excess of the lawyer's estimate of the recovery at
trial, and thereby rejecting the client's assertion that she was harassed into the
agreement).
165. Daley v. County of Butte, 227 Cal. App. 2d 380, 391, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693, 700
(1964)(the client must seek redress against the lawyer rather than have the ne-
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may be relieved of a default "taken against him or her through his or
her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." 66 A court
may also grant relief to a client if the lawyer's procedural errors are so
extreme as to deprive the client of representation 67 or impair the cli-
ent's cause of action.' 68 Granting relief from these errors protects the
glect reversed); Buckert v. Briggs, 15 Cal. App. 3d 296, 301, 93 Cal. Rptr. 61, 63
(1971)(the inexcusable neglect of an attorney is usually not a proper basis for
granting the client's motion for relief of a default under the relevant California
statute, CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 473 (West Supp. 1990)).
166. CAL. Cxv. PROC. CODE § 473 (West Supp. 1990). E.g., in Robinson v. Varela, 67 Cal.
App. 3d 611,136 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1977), the court pointed to the following factors in
granting defendant relief from default- plaintiff's lawyer refused to grant an ex-
tension to answer an unlawful detainer summons within the five day period and
quietly filed the request to enter default on the first possible day without notify-
ing defendant's lawyer-, the illness of the chief trial deputy at defense counsel's
office; the limited hours during Christmas week, and defense counsel's preoccu-
pation with other litigated matters. Id. at 616,136 Cal. Rptr. at 785. In Manning
v. Wymer, 273 Cal. App. 2d 519, 78 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1969), a lawyer was unaware
that his associate had settled another related lawsuit on the condition that it
would not prejudice the lawsuit that was the subject of a summary judgment mo-
tion. At the argument on the motion the lawyer failed to advise the court of the
agreement and the court granted the motion. The court of appeals granted relief
from the summary judgment based on excusable mistake. Id. at 528, 78 Cal. Rptr.
at 605. In Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1986) plaintiff was
entitled to a hearing to determine whether a secretarial error which caused a
voluntary dismissal to be entered with prejudice constituted mistake, inadver-
tence or excusable neglect. Id. at 1224. Accord FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b). See also
Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Improper Jus-
tification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys' Procedural Er-
rors, 1988 DUKE L.J. 733 (criticizing the agency theory as a basis for sanctioning
clients for their attorneys' procedural errors); Note, Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Engineering Co.: Inexcusable Neglect by Whom?, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 695
(1984)(analyzing cases in which the client sought relief pursuant to a claim of
gross attorney neglect).
167. In re Marriage of Park, 27 Cal. 3d 337,342,612 P.2d 882,887-88,165 Cal. Rptr. 792,
796 (1980)(Attorney of record was appointed a commissioner, and the client never
agreed to a substitution or association of new counsel because she was involunta-
rily deported. Client never received notice of the new attorney's actions, nor did
the attorney know she was deported, consult with her, investigate her case, or
present any evidence on her behalf, thus denying her an adversary hearing.); Or-
ange Empire Nat'l Bank v. Kirk, 259 Cal. App. 2d 347, 353-54, 66 Cal. Rptr. 240,
244-45 (1968)(defendant's lawyer failed to file an appearance, even though he re-
ceived the complaint five days after service was made; failed to take any action to
set aside the default; failed to appear at the trial; and did nothing to protect his
client from the effects of the judgment); Daley v. County of Butte, 227 Cal. App.
2d 380, 391-92, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699-700 (1964)(plaintiff's lawyer failed to serve
process, failed to appear at successive pretrial conferences, failed to communicate
with the court, client and other counsel, and held on to the substitution of attor-
ney for more than five months until the successful motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution was filed).
168. Central Distribs., Inc. v. M.E.T., Inc., 403 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968)(lawyer
should be allowed to amend pre-tril stipulation to permit introduction of evi-
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client's control over the ultimate resolution of his case.169 But in
those situations where the lawyer's conduct is dilatory,170 rather than
inadvertent, 171 and the conduct was not extremely prejudicial, the cli-
ent remains bound by the lawyer's action and must seek relief against
the attorney.
In deciding whether to relieve a client of a lawyer's procedural er-
ror where serious prejudice might ensue, courts consider several fac-
tors. The client should seek relief promptly, and the opposing party
should not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.172 In addition the court
dence of damages to prevent injustice); Daley v. County of Butte, 227 Cal. App. 2d
380, 391, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (1964).
169. Elston v. City of Turlock, 38 Cal. 3d 227, 233, 695 P.2d 713, 716-17, 211 Cal. Rptr.
416, 419 (1985)(when granting relief from default the courts rely on the policy
that the law strongly favors trial on the merits); Manning v. Wymer, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 519, 528, 78 Cal. Rptr. 600, 605 (1969).
170. Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 32 Cal. 3d 892, 895-96, 654 P.2d 775, 776, 187
Cal. Rptr. 592, 593 (1982)(The lawyer received four extensions of time to produce
documents, but still failed to produce them after two court orders compelling
production. He also failed to appear at two court appearances, and the second
resulted in the dismissal of the action. There the lawyer-client relationship was
not severed, and the lawyer was guilty of gross negligence.). But see Shea v. Don-
ohoe Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(plaintiff's complaint was
reinstated where only counsel was negligent, plaintiff was unaware of the negli-
gence and dismissal was unnecessary to remedy the prejudice to the defendant or
to the judicial system caused by the failure of plaintiff's attorney to attend three
separate status calls within a three week period); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and
Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1987)(dismissal for failure to prosecute is
warranted only if the following factors are considered. the party's personal re-
sponsibility, prejudice to the adversary, history of dilatoriness, bad faith of party
or lawyer, consideration of alternative sanctions, and meritoriousness of the
party's claim or defense).
171. E.g., Giles v. Giles, 404 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1981)(Defendants are entitled to a
hearing on their motion for relief from a judgment to determine why defendants'
lawyer failed to introduce a deed into evidence which would have been a partial
defense to the lawsuit); Elston v. City of Turlock, 38 Cal. 3d 227, 238, 695 P.2d 713,
717, 211 Cal. Rptr. 416, 423 (1985)(The lawyer failed to respond to requests for
admissions which went to the heart of the case. Because two attorneys had re-
cently left the firm and the office was shorthanded, the requests were misplaced,
and the lawyer was unaware of them until the answers were overdue. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court granted plaintiff's request for relief.); Campbell v. Archer,
555 S.W.2d 110, 112-13 (Tenn. 1977)(Defendants entitled to a new trial because
their attorney failed to take note of a notice of trial date and they did not arrive at
the court until after the trial had begun. Plaintiffs suffered no particular preju-
dice, but defendants must bear the costs they incur for a retrial.).
172. Elston v. City of Turlock 38 Cal. 3d 227, 233, 695 P.2d 713, 716, 211 Cal. Rptr. 416,
419 (1985)(Whether the client's delay in filing the motion for relief is reasonable
depends upon the circumstances. Thus if the trial judge wrote the clients that
they had six months in which to file a motion, and if the client's new lawyer
would not accept employment until a retainer was paid and if the clients had
difficulty in raising the money, a five month delay was not unreasonable.); In re
Marriage of Park, 27 Cal. 3d 337, 342, 612 P.2d 882, 888, 165 Cal. Rptr. 792, 796
(1980) (client's four year delay in filing her motion to vacate a judgment of disso-
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considers whether the client has a meritorious claim or defense.173 In
cases in which there is a total breakdown of the lawyer-client relation-
ship, other significant factors include whether the client is free from
personal neglect 74 and whether the attorney's action amounts to posi-
tive misconduct.' 7 5
In some instances courts recognize that a lawyer's procedural mis-
takes may obliterate the client's substantive claim and that a client
may not be aware of the serious implications of these errors. 76 In
lution was not unreasonable in light of the facts that she was deported before the
interlocutory hearing;, her husband was present when she was arrested; their
common immigration lawyer did nothing;, her husband concealed the fact that she
was deported; she was unaware that her lawyer had been named a court commis-
sioner, she attempted to contact her lawyer from Korea; she immediately applied
for re-entry and re-entered as soon as it was granted; she filed her motion to
vacate within one month of learning of the judgment); Buckert v. Briggs, 15 Cal.
App. 3d 296,302,93 Cal. Rptr. 61,64-65 (1971)(merely having to try the issues that
were determined by default is not sufficient prejudice to the opposing party for
the court to deny the motion); Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J.
Super. 190, 192-95, 486 A.2d 920, 921-23, (App. Div. 1985)(Motion to set aside de-
fault entered because the plaintiffs' attorney failed to file answers to interrogato-
ries was remanded to the trial court to determine whether defendant had been
prejudiced by three year delay. The long delay was understandable because
plaintiffs' lawyer repeatedly told them that the trial was imminent.).
173. In re Marriage of Park, 27 Cal. 3d 337,342,612 P.2d 882,888-89,165 Cal. Rptr. 792,
796 (1980).
174. Orange Empire Nat'l Bank v. Kirk, 259 Cal. App. 2d 347, 353, 66 Cal. Rptr. 240,
244 (1968)(fact that the client knew other lawyers to consult or was experienced
in politics does not create an inference that she was neglectful). In another case
the court stated,
Clients should not be forced to act as hawklike inquisitors of their own
counsel, suspicious of every step and quick to switch lawyers. The legal
profession knows no worse headache than the client who mistrusts his
attorney. The lay litigant enters a temple of mysteries whose ceremo-
nies are dark, complex and unfathomable. Pretrial procedures are the
cabalistic rituals of the lawyers and judges who serve as priests and high
priests. The layman knows nothing of their tactical significance. He
knows only that his case remains in limbo while the priests and high
priests chant their lengthy and arcane pretrial rites. He does know this
much: that several years frequently elapse between the commencement
and trial of lawsuits. Since the law imposes this state of puzzled patience
on the litigant, it should permit him to sit back in peace and confidence
without suspicious inquiries and without incessant checking on counsel.
Daley v. County of Butte, 227 Cal. App. 2d 380, 392, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693, 700-01
(1964).
175. Buckert v. Briggs, 15 Cal. App. 3d 296, 301-02, 93 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64-65 (1971)(Law-
yer failed to appear at trial or notify the clients of the date, when he knew of the
trial date. His reason was that he thought the clients had lost interest in the case,
when the clients had never communicated their lack of interest. He then failed
to do anything to set aside the judgment, despite his promise to do so. The court
held that the lawyer had obliterated the lawyer-client relationship and his failure
to advise his clients of the trial date was positive misconduct.).
176. Other authors have argued that the application of agency theory in other contexts
results in similar harsh or inconsistent outcomes. See, e-g., Note, Dismimsal with
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these cases the client may be entitled to relief other than against the
lawyer, despite the lawyer's purported authority in procedural
matters.
As has been illustrated, courts make exceptions to the lawyer's
procedural authority. Additionally, courts are increasingly willing to
either bend or reject the client's authority and bind him to a settle-
ment which he asserts he did not authorize. Some commentators have
begun to recognize that the traditional agency model does not ade-
quately describe the distribution of authority within the lawyer-client
relationship. In response, other theories have been offered to better
account for the allocation of authority and proposals have been made
to reform the court's approach.
IV. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL
AGENCY DOCTRINE
A. Modified Agency Theories
1. Reciprocal Agency
Some writers have attempted to interpret agency law to conform to
the reality of the allocation of authority within the lawyer-client rela-
tionship as defined by the codes of ethics and case decisions. Acknowl-
edging that a simple agency concept is inaccurate because the lawyer
often has too much authority, 77 Professor Patterson described the
lawyer-client relationship historically as one of "reciprocal agency" in
which the lawyer is the principal in some areas and the client in
others. 78
The problems with the reciprocal agency theory as a basis for ana-
lyzing the lawyer-client relationship are twofold. First, while this
model creates a rationale for the traditional substance/procedure stan-
dard found in the cases, it no longer describes a true agency relation-
ship with one principal controlling one agent. Second, this grant of
Prejudice for Failure to Prosecute.- Visiting the Sins of the Attorney upon the
Client, 22 GA. L. REv. 195 (1987) [hereinafter Dismissal with Prejudice]; Note,
Negligent Litigation and Relief from Judgments: The Case for a Second Chance,
50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1207 (1977) [hereinafter Negligent Litigation].
177. Patterson, supra note 2, at 914.
178. Id. at 926. To determine in which matters the lawyer is the principal and there-
fore has the authority to make decisions, Patterson referred to the three different
duties which the rules of ethics impose on lawyers: duty of loyalty to the client,
the duty of candor to the tribunal, and the duty of fairness to others. The lawyer
has authority to make decisions that involve the last two areas, and the client
makes decisions over all substantial legal rights as they affect him provided they
do not involve the lawyer's other duties and are within the limits of the law. Id.
at 927. Thus, the lawyer determines what the client's rights and duties are and
acts lawfully in accordance with this determination. Id. at 964-65. Since the law-
yer has these other duties, the lawyer may not act criminally or fraudulently or
violate the rules of the legal system.
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authority could leave the client completely out of procedural decisions
that may be important to him. If the lawyer is designated the princi-
pal in procedural matters, he may override or ignore the client in
making those decisions.
2. Joint Venture Model
Building on this reciprocal agency concept, another author charac-
terized the decisionmaking framework of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct'79 as a collaborative "joint venture" model, 8 0
emphasizing that communication and allocation are the critical com-
ponents of this structure.' 8 ' The client decides objectives.' 8 2 The law-
yer, after consultation with the client, has final authority to decide the
means by which these objectives are to be pursued. 83 The lawyer
must override the client's decision to follow a questionable course of
conduct. If the client will not forego that course, the lawyer must de-
cline or withdraw. 84
This "means/objectives" allocation forms the basis for a scheme for
predicting how courts will decide authority disputes.B5 The represen-
tational context and the nature of decisions define the presumptive
sphere of authority. In civil litigation, for example, courts allocate de-
cisions of substance or outcome-related decisions to the client; proce-
dural and tactical decisions are allocated to the lawyer.186
Under this scheme, three additional factors may rebut this sub-
stance/procedure presumption. First, the attributes of a specific cli-
ent-lawyer relationship may affect whether a third party may
justifiably assume that a lawyer has authority greater than that which
179. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983).
180. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under 1he Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049,1080 (1984). The author described
the joint venture relationship as "personal and terminable at will." Id. at 1067.
'Each is respected as an individual with legitimate claims to autonomy, dignity,
and responsibility." Id. "Mutual expectations are initially defined and are re-
vised as the relationship develops. Each participant contributes valued resources
to the common end." Id. To resolve disputes within the joint venture model, indi-
viduality, economic interests, and societal interests in the legal system should be
balanced. Id. at 1070.
181. Id. at 1061.
182. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983).
183. Maute, supra note 180, at 1064.
184. Id. at 1065; MODEL RuLEs OF 'PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rules 1.2(e),
1.16(a)(1)(1983).
185. Maute, supra note 180 at 1081.
186. Id. at 1082. The client usually bears the consequences of decisions involving legal,
moral, or financial risk and has authority over those choices. The lawyer bears
moral and legal risk and has principal authority for issues relating to the legiti-
macy of the legal system, such as creation and use of documents, spurious or in-
flammatory claims, and perjured or deceptive testimony. Id. at 1082-83.
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is normal for the particular subject matter of the representation.'8 7
Second, the identity of the client may affect how much explanation a
client requires to make an informed decision.-88 Finally, whether the
lawyer acted in an emergency or whether the client objected quickly
to a decision may affect whether that decision should be upheld.189 By
applying the presumptions and the rebuttable factors, Maute attempts
to make some sense out of often inconsistent decisions regarding ques-
tions of authority.190
The joint venture model involves a complicated topology with vari-
ous presumptive spheres and rebuttable factors to explain authority
decisions. However, even its creator recognizes its limitations when
she notes that the cases reach inconsistent dispositions on similar facts
because of "judicial ambivalence about authority questions."191 Addi-
tionally, while the model espouses a collaborative approach to lawyer-
ing, the topology reinforces the results found in the cases. The means-
187. Id. at 1083. A long-term or extensive representation may justify an assumption of
greater authority than a first-time or single relationship.
188. Id. An unsophisticated client may require increased explanation.
189. Id. at 1084. First, if there is a true emergency, the lawyer may act without con-
sulting the client. Second, if the client objects to the decision promptly, rather
than waiting to learn of an ultimate outcome and thereby reducing judicial econ-
omy and upsetting stable judgments, the court may be more willing to protect the
client's interests.
190. Generally, in the civil litigation context, the client has exclusive control over the
cause of action and the subject matter of the litigation: who to sue, for how much,
and when to settle, unless the lawyer has ostensible authority to act otherwise.
Id. at 1087. Settlement authority, not inherently belonging to lawyer, may be
inferred from a course of conduct or upheld by ratification. Id. at 1089.
The lawyer, on the other hand, has control in areas of tactics and procedures
with authority to bind the client even if the actions are detrimental. Id. at 1090.
This broad authority is justified to maintain the effective operation of the adver-
sary system: courts and litigants must rely and act upon the decisions made by a
lawyer during litigation. Id. at 1091. Finality of judgments and certainty mean
that clients have little relief after the end of litigation. However, clients can ob-
ject to decisions and remove attorneys with whose tactical choices they disagree.
Id.
Stipulations and concessions during litigation fall within an overlapping area.
Id. at 1093. Counsel has authority to make binding concessions of fact or law-
simplifying issues, eliminating weak claims and defenses, and stipulating on evi-
dentiary, factual or legal questions. Id. at 1094. But if a procedural stipulation
harms the client's substantive rights it may be set aside if it involves a lawyer's
breach of loyalty or a court's abuse of administrative power. Id. at 1093. The
lawyer also has implied authority to make spontaneous tactical decisions. Id.
Finally, the litigator can override a small group of unethical or illegal client
choices when they conflict with her responsibilities to the system, profession, or
herself. For example the lawyer can pay necessary litigation expenses, reject
frivolous claims, and false evidence. Also the lawyer can protect his own legiti-
mate economic interests. Id. at 1094-95.
191. Id. at 1081. Furthermore, Maute notes, the law in this area is "fact-specific" and
that prediction of results is risky because "each client-lawyer relationship is
unique." Id.
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objectives framework is maintained, but it is balanced by requiring in-
creased communication and consultation between lawyer and client on
the one hand and by enhanced lawyer prerogatives in procedural mat-
ters on the other.192 Ultimately, agency principles remain the basis
for determining authority questions within this framework. 9 3
B. Informed Consent
In response to the problems inherent in the agency model of the
lawyer-client relationship, several authors have called for the intro-
duction of the medical concept of "informed consent"194 into the prac-
tice of law.195 The purposes of this innovation are to broaden the
client's decision-making authority'9 6 and to require that lawyers pro-
vide their clients with the information necessary to make decisions.197
In addition, proponents argue that an informed consent rule would
eliminate the confusion created by the "subject-matter/procedure or
tactics" line of cases.198
It has been suggested that informed consent could be instituted
through three means. First, the client could enforce the doctrine of
192. Id. at 1106-07.
193. Id. at 1087.
194. "The doctrine of informed consent, then combines the patient's right to make a
decision with a requirement that the physician provide sufficient information to
make the exercise of that right meaningful." Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Dei-
sionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41,
48-49 (1979). In the legal field, Spiegel argued that the presumption should be
that the client has control over all aspects of his case. 1d. at 73.
195. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307
(1980); Spiegel, supra note 194; Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Cli-
ent Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1987).
196. Spiegel, supra note 194, at 72.
197. Id. at 104.
198. Id. at 52. The malpractice cases tend to protect the client's authority to settle a
matter, but they do not identify which procedures or tactics are controlled by the
lawyers. Spiegel analyzes another set of cases, referred to as the "third party
benefit" cases. If a lawyer-agent acts without the authority of his client-principal
and a third party benefits, must the third party give up the benefit or is the client
bound? The cases do not deal directly with whether the allocation of authority is
a separate issue from withdrawal of this third party benefit. While the cases ana-
lyze the problem from an "express-implied" authority perspective, they are in
effect more consistent with a theory based on considerations of fairness and effi-
ciency to the third parties. Id. at 54-55. A similar "fairness and efficiency" analy-
sis is applied in attorney default cases where the attorney completely drops the
ball and the client loses his right to pursue a claim. Id. at 61-62.
Spiegel comments further that while the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSiBmrY uses broader language (decisions "not affecting the merits of the
cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client" in MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980)) than the cases, it does not clearly define
which decisions are meant to fall within those general categories. Id. at 65-67.
See Martyn, supra note 195, at 331-32; Strauss, supra note 195, at 324-26.
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informed consent through malpractice lawsuits.199 However, doctri-
nal or statutory changes in the malpractice area are unlikely to bring
about a shift in the decision making authority within the lawyer-client
relationship because of the difficult causation and damages require-
ments of malpractice cases. 200 Clients (and their contingency fee paid
lawyers) are unlikely to undergo the stresses of another lawsuit in or-
der to vindicate the "dignitary right" to informed consent unless they
can prove substantial damages.
A second means of enforcing this reallocation of authority is
through changes in legal ethics.201 While the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct may be an improvement over the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in this regard,202 clients must rely on an
already overburdened (and lawyer-controlled) disciplinary system to
see that such rules are enforced. Moreover, since clients do not di-
rectly benefit from the results of a disciplinary process, they have lit-
tle incentive to use it.
Finally, proponents argue that changes in legal education could
bring about reallocation of authority in lawyer-client decision making.
Changes in the malpractice doctrine and ethical standards would then
reinforce this idea.203 If an attitude of encouraging increased client
decisionmaking was reflected in classes on professional responsibility,
then a new generation of lawyers might show deference for their cli-
ents' authority.
However, the limits on the ability of law schools to change the
standards of practice may be evident from recent experiences with
"zealous advocacy." It seems ironic that the strengthening of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11204 in 1983 to encourage courts to sanction
199. Martyn, supra note 195, at 343-53; Spiegel, supra note 194, at 134-36.
200. Martyn, supra note 195, at 350; Spiegel, supra note 194, at 138.
201. Spiegel, supra note 194, at 139.
202. See Maute, supra note 180, at 1055-57, 1060-63, comparing MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FEssIONAL RESPONSImILTY EC 7-7, EC 7-8 and DR 7-101 (1980) with MODEL
RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rules 1.2, 1.4 (1983)(The latter more clearly
deals with issues of decisionmaking authority and require the lawyer to give the
client sufficient information so he can participate in making decisions. However,
the Rules do not mention informed consent.).
203. Spiegel, supra note 194, at 138-39.
204. Under the new version of the rule, sanctions must be assessed against the lawyer
and/or client for filing a pleading, motion, or paper that, after reasonable inquiry,
is not well grounded in fact, is not warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or is inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as harassment or delay. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
See, e.g., Balfour Guthrie, Inc. v. Hunter Marine Transp., Inc., 118 FRLD. 66, 73
(M.D. Tenn. 1987). Former Rule 11 only required that lawyers act with "good
faith," a subjective standard, in representing their clients. Whittington v. Ohio
River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 204 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
The new standard closely reflects the objective standards imposed by the
Model Code and Model Rules. In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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litigation abuses205 came after almost a decade of emphasis on teach-
ing of ethics in law schools 20o6 and the growth of clinical and skills
courses.2 07 Apparently these changes in the law school curriculum
were unsuccessful in teaching future lawyers more about their role in
the lawyer-client relationship and the justice system. It is equally du-
bious that changes in legal education alone would be more successful
in affecting the distribution of authority in the lawyer-client
relationship.
None of the three alternative models of authority within the law-
yer-client relationship effectively deals with the problems inherent in
the agency model and the substance/procedure distinction. Reformu-
lating agency into reciprocal agency or a joint venture in essence only
offers a new rationale for the current approach. As important as the
principle of informed consent could be for enhancing client autonomy
and guiding lawyers' behavior, it does not offer the courts a basis for
deciding disputes about decision making authority other than in mal-
practice actions.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
It is apparent that agency principles are increasingly inappropriate
for understanding the distribution of authority within the lawyer-cli-
ent relationship in a civil litigation context. Applying either the re-
ciprocal agency or the joint venture model leads ultimately to the
same substance/procedure division of authority,208 with all of the in-
But it is not a coincidence that the newly-inserted language in Rule 11
(the part emphasized in this Opinion's quotation from the Rule) mirrors
the standards in ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(2) and in ABA MODEL RULE OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.1
and its accompanying comment. All of them - Rule 1-1, the DR and the
Model Rule - teach that a lawyer's duty to his or her client cannot be
permitted to override his or her duty to the justice system, defined by all
three of those rules.
Id. at 497.
The purpose of sanctions against the client is deterrence, while against the
lawyer they are also punishing for a dereliction of duty. Eastway Constr. Corp. v.
City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1987).
205. See, eg., S. M. KAssIN, AN EMPuICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS ix (1985);
Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions 97 YALE L.J. 901, 901
(1988).
206. The Professional Responsibility Examination was first administered as part of
the California Bar Examination in February, 1975 and was sold to the National
Conference of Bar Examiners in March, 1980.
207. The Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility was established
in 1968 to foster clinical education in American law schools.
208. Lawyers may more accurately be described as independent contractors: agents
whose physical acts the principal has no right to control. The principal has the
right to control the independent contractor, and the latter must agree to act on
the principal's behalf. Accordingly a lawyer would have no duty of absolute obe-
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:473
herent difficulties that have led courts to abandon or distort the
agency theory.209 Yet, if courts are to discard the agency theory, they
will have to find a new vehicle for determining when an attorney's
decisions will bind his client.
One might propose that clients should be entitled to relief in all
cases. If courts were to adopt an informed consent theory,210 a client
could conceivably overturn any step taken by his lawyer. While this
would protect the interests of the client in controlling his cause of ac-
tion, it might do so at great expense to judicial efficiency and to the
interests of opposing parties. In addition, such an approach would
have a detrimental impact on the legal profession's ability to function.
Lawyers would face the unhappy prospect of having their clients con-
tinually second guessing their work, or even worse, of being reduced
to mere instruments of their client's bidding without any deference
paid to their professional expertise.21 1
Instead, it is proposed here that we approach the problem by can-
didly recognizing that resolution of decision making disputes requires
a balancing of the competing interests at stake. The basic question to
be resolved in such cases then becomes whether the goal of protecting
the individual client is such that it outweighs the countervailing inter-
dience: the client may not interfere with the customary freedom the lawyer has;
in addition the lawyer need not obey any "unreasonable" order or one that re-
quires the lawyer to perform illegal or unethical acts because the lawyer has obli-
gations to the legal system and third parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 14n (1957).
While the independent contractor analogy may be more accurate than either
the traditional agency or joint venture ideas, it does not solve the authority prob-
lem. If anything, it rationalizes wider authority for the lawyer because the client
may not interfere with the lawyer's customary freedom. Depending upon what is
customary, the lawyer may indeed have wide discretion to act without consulting
his client. And, again it returns to the substance/procedure dichotomy to define
this customary freedom. The decisions which are important to that client might
be overridden because they are customarily procedural; or merely defining sub-
stance may be a problem.
209. Other authors have likewise recognized that the application of agency theory re-
sults in harsh or inconsistent outcomes. See, eg., Dismissal with Prejudice, supra
note 176; Negligent Litigation, supra note 176.
210. See supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
211. While the authority cases do not often present questions of wrongful conduct, one
critic has noted that the agency model, which largely ignores the lawyer's duties
of candor to the justice system and fairness to third parties, has the potential of
pushing lawyers towards illegal or wrongful conduct. The undivided client loy-
alty and confidentiality which the agency model fosters are thus questionable for
they may lead to a lawyer's lying and deception. Burke, "Truth in Lawyering".
An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the Practice of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1984). '"The autonomous client model really becomes a convenient excuse for
lawyers to justify doing things for their clients that they presumably would not
do for themselves. Whatever rights an autonomous client may have, he has no
right to legal assistance in illegal or wrongful conduct." Id. at 5-6.
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ests of other parties to the litigation and the public's interest in judi-
cial efficiency. In weighing the client's interests, the court should
consider the nature of the specific lawyer-client relationship, the so-
phistication of the individual client, the extent of the client's involve-
ment in the challenged action, and the degree of prejudice to the client
if he loses this dispute. In assessing the interests of other parties, the
court should evaluate any prejudice they would suffer should the cli-
ent overturn the decision, and determine whether that prejudice can
be alleviated through cost-shifting or other devices. The interests to
be considered under judicial efficiency include the ability of the court
to sanction delinquent lawyers, and whether any harm has occurred to
other litigants whose interests might be delayed.212
A. The Client's Interests
1. The Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Analyzing the actual lawyer-client relationship would replace
agency theory's focus on presumptive areas of client and lawyer au-
thority.213 Courts would examine the understanding of this lawyer
and this client about the distribution of authority in their specific rela-
tionship. That relationship might reflect a traditional division of au-
thority, where the lawyer assumes control of all procedural
decisions,214 or one in which the client delegates even wider authority
212. Several courts have identified a series of factors to be considered when a com-
plaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute. Dunbar v. Tiangle Lumber and Sup-
ply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1987)(dismissal for failure to prosecute is
warranted only if the following factors are considered: the party's personal re-
sponsibility; prejudice to the adversary; history of dilatoriness; bad faith of party
or lawyer;, consideration of alternative sanctions; and meritoriousness of the
party's claim or defense).
213. Abandoning this presumption might ameliorate the problem of "procedural fe-
tishism" in which substantive issues are turned into procedural ones. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REV. 29, 113. Once clients turn their problems over to lawyers, they lose control
of the problem, and the lawyer's view of the problem predominates. A client's
individual choices of ends and means to resolve the dispute are submerged in the
justice system, denying them responsibility for what occurs. Id. at 115. Moreover
since it is the lawyer who controls the access to the courts, he has great power
over the unsophisticated client. Id. at 116.
214. What does a client want from a lawyer when he hires one to represent him in a
lawsuit? One suggested answer is to do what the client cannot do for himself: to
be rational and make wise decisions in a controversy; to comply with various pro-
cedural rules and understand substantive rules; and to communicate effectively
in a courtroom setting. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37
MERCER L. REV. 647, 661 (1986). A lawyer can be a zealous advocate within the
bounds of law, but the client should be no better nor worse off than had s/he
proceeded pro se. Id. at 662.
A lawyer can make moral choices to do what he wants. The system allows a
lawyer to reject certain cases and clients, or to stop being a lawyer. Moreover, the
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to the lawyer.215 If the lawyer-client relationship is actually denoted
by broad client delegation to the lawyer, the less likely the client will
be able to avoid a settlement agreement or avoid responsibility for his
lawyer's procedural errors, since the client can then be deemed to
have approved his lawyer's conduct.
On the other hand, the client and his attorney may have provided
for something approaching informed consent,216 either in their re-
tainer agreement or through their evolving mutual dealings.217 If
courts uphold a client's objections to his lawyer's actions when the lat-
ter has violated their mutual understanding, including matters of pro-
cedure,218 this would respect the ideal of informed consent and client
consultation, stimulating greater client involvement. 219 Moreover,
lawyer can refuse to do on moral grounds what the client may legally be entitled
to; the system does not make a lawyer act immorally. Id. at 663-65. Since the
client is supposed to be no better off for having hired a lawyer, the client has no
right to expect the lawyer to help him commit perjury, for example.
215. See Smedley v. Temple Drilling Co., 782 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1986)(client gave ex-
press authority to his claims adjustor and the lawyer the adjustor hired to settle
cases without consulting with the client).
The agency model has been criticized for reinforcing paternalism in the law-
yer-client relationship. Because lawyers have such wide authority over tactical
matters, they are encouraged to think that they know best. Luban, Paternalism
and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIs. L. REv. 454,458. The author gives three prac-
tices that demonstrate that lawyers should make important decisions:
1. Chambers conferences customarily involve lawyers only.
2. Judges are notoriously hostile to pro se litigants.
3. Lawyers will not speak to another party if he is represented by counsel. Id.
at 459-60.
However, the author points out, this means/ends dichotomy (in which the
lawyer is supposed to be paternalistic about means) misses the point because it
assumes a dichotomy the client does not necessarily share. How the client gets to
a certain result may be equally important to a client as the result itself. If the
lawyer need not consult the client about the means, the lawyer will never know
the significance of means to the client. Furthermore, professionals, by their
training, tend to view all of their client's problems as technical and professional.
Id. at 459 & n.9.
216. See supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
217. One court, at least, noted that a client need not passively accept his lawyer's every
recommendation by denying the lawyer's motion to withdraw over the client's
objections because the client disagreed with his strategy decision to move for a
continuance; the court also found that the lawyer-client relationship had not so
deteriorated that they could not work together. Mekdeci ez rel Mekdeci v. Mer-
rell Nat'l Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir. 1983).
218. Note that under the agency model, courts sometimes uphold lawyer's procedural
decisions even where it violates the explicit agreement with the client; i.e., the
presumptive areas of authority are sometimes conclusive. See supra notes 72-87
and accompanying text. This would not happen under the proposed model.
219. This altered lawyer-client relationship is similar to that proposed by critical legal
scholars. Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1983).
These authors argue that a lawyer should create a client who is capable of holding
the lawyer accountable for what she does by endeavoring to create a relationship
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lawyers would be encouraged to do the kind of counseling necessary to
make informed consent functional and thereby reduce client
dissatisfaction.
If the overall lawyer-client relationship is characterized by exten-
sive client interaction, this fact would be significant should the client
seek to escape an agreement or avoid the effects of his lawyer's proce-
dural mishaps. The greater the client's general involvement in the de-
cision making process, the more difficult it should be to void a
settlement agreement or avoid responsibility for a lawyer's procedural
errors. A client who maintains close involvement can be deemed to
have approved of his lawyer's conduct.
2. The Sophistication of the Client
The courts should also take into account the sophistication of the
client, and particularly his knowledge of and experience with the liti-
gation process. A large institutional client is more likely than an indi-
vidual client to be actively involved in legal actions and decisions.2 20
An institutional client is often aware of the nature of the legal system
and has the resources to monitor the performance of counsel.221 An
institution's attorney is consequently motivated to inform the client of
developments in order to keep the client satisfied and to further the
of respect and equality with his client; he should endeavor to demystify the sym-
bolic authority of the state and reshape legal conflicts to show the political and
economic foundations of these legal disputes. Id. at 376. The lawyer must be
more closely involved with the client's case, having together set a strategic and
political agenda. Id. at 379. This affects small cases as well as traditionally polit-
ical ones. In the former the lawyer can see the common thread in what are other-
wise small cases to make them political statements. Id. at 397-98.
See also Simon, Visioms of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469
(1984). The author rejects the fiction that the lawyer is always accountable to the
client. Rather the client's goals are indeterminate and those goals are affected by
the system in which his interests are played out. This notion of lawyering in-
volves both personal responsibility by the lawyer and political commitment to
change the system and the actors in it. Id. at 488-89.
220. How lawyers and clients interact may depend greatly on who is the client. Those
who represent individuals rather than corporate or large organizational clients
are likely to have greater authority and freedom of action within the lawyer-
client relationship. J. HEINz & E. LAUmANN, CHICAGO LAWYERs: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 323 (1982). Organizational clients, in contrast to individu-
als, have the resources to supervise attorneys and thereby to control the positions
that attorneys take. Id. at 322. Moreover, firms that represent large clients with
substantial market power may be financially dependent on, and therefore defer-
ential to, one client. Id. at 338.
221. Some courts have already considered the sophistication of the client as a factor in
deciding whether to enforce settlement agreements. In Mathewson Corp. v. Al-
lied Marine Indus. Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 854 (1st Cir. 1987), the court stated, "[w]e
think it highly significant in this respect that these negotiations transpired be-
tween sophisticated business entities represented by seasoned counsel."
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lawyer's own interest in a continuing relationship.222 Moreover, be-
cause the lawyer and the institutional client are more likely to share
common values, conflict is less frequent, and the lawyer is more in-
clined to carefully respect the client's wishes.223
Expressed in traditional agency terms, when a lawyer representing
an institutional client takes action, he is likely to have express author-
ity from the client.22 4 Since it is probable that the institutional client
carefully selects its lawyer, it is fair to bind it to the decisions the at-
torney later makes. Moreover this type of client is virtually certain to
understand that its instructions to its lawyer imply that counsel has
authority to act on his behalf.
In contrast, an individual client without a continuing relationship
with a particular lawyer and who lacks detailed knowledge of the legal
system is far less likely to consciously delegate authority to his law-
yer.2 25 Communication between them is probably minimal, is not al-
222. For example, one analysis of large firm corporate practice rejected the theory
that diversification of law firm client bases freed individual lawyers from depen-
dence on particular clients. In truth, which lawyer controlled a client was impor-
tant to an individual lawyer's prestige and authority within the firm. Nelson,
Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Rela-
tionships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 528 (1985). Thus, lawyers
spent a substantial proportion of their time on the client for whom they worked
the most, averaging more than one-third in the sample as a whole. Id. at 529.
Large firms today are dependent on in-house lawyers throwing work their
way, diminishing the close relationship between a corporation and one firm. J.
HEINz & E. LAuMANN, supra note 220, at 367. Since corporations also tend to
spread out the work among many firms, this makes each firm insecure. Id. at 369.
To accommodate their clients, firms have opened branches to be near clients, Id.
at 369-70, or avoided taking cases or clients that offend major clients. Id. at 371.
223. Litigators in large firms were less likely to question their client's demands or
refuse work because it was contrary to their personal values. Nelson, supra note
222, at 534. These lawyers saw most of their tasks as technical; their values were
similar to their clients' and they transformed moral issues into procedural ones.
Id. at 537-38. Given the limited scope of the lawyer's discretion, it is unlikely that
disputes about authority will arise in this kind of representation.
While corporate lawyers may be in the position to influence clients' decisions,
the question remains whether they are willing to confront their clients over dif-
fering values, or whether they have different values at all. Heinz, The Power of
Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REv. 891, 900-01 (1983). See also Macaulay, Lawyers and Con-
sumer Protection Laws, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 115 (1979), in which the author
makes a similar point that the lawyers who represent businesses tend to share
values with their clients and have greater respect for their clients than do the
lawyers who represent "deadbeat" consumers.
224. The institutional client is the one described by the court in Link v. Wabash R.R.,
370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962). See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
225. The little that is known about the lawyer-client relationship from empirical stud-
ies undermines the assumption implicit in Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626 (1962),
that the attorney/agent is controlled by the client/principal and consults with
and respects the client's wishes in the representation, at least in terms of lawyers
who represent individuals in such matters as personal injury, divorce, and con-
sumer affairs. One study of personal injury clients and their attorneys summa-
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ways clear,226 and may at times be deliberately distorted.227 An
rized its findings as follows: "[c]lients are forced to delegate decision making
responsibility to attorneys who then refuse to accept this responsibility when per-
formance breaks down." D. RoSENTHAJL, LAWYERS AND CLENTS: WHO'S IN
CHARGE 144 (1974).
This study also noted that lay clients were handicapped in getting and evaluat-
ing information about their claims by their inexperience and by their dependence
upon their lawyer's candor and directness. Id. at 50. The Link Court rationalized
holding clients responsible for their lawyers misdeeds because clients exercised
free choice in choosing their lawyers. The Rosenthal study indicated that the
inexperience of personal injury plaintiffs was reflected in the rather haphazard
system they used to choose a lawyer. Most were chosen through a single referral
from a lawyer, friend or relative. Id. at 129.
226. In reality, mistrust is an ever-present aspect of the client-lawyer relationship.
Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981).
First, the lawyer might tell the client that he is unlikely to prevail and the lawyer
is even sympathetic to the law as it is written (client loses). Id. at 1019. Moreover
both lawyer and client might not want to acknowledge this mistrust because cli-
ent will fear that the lawyer will abandon him and lawyers only want to see
happy clients. Id. at 1020. Even when the lawyer gives the most favorable prog-
nosis, some clients will still find conflict intolerable. They want only to win, and
to win at every turn. If this aggressive attitude is not revealed to the lawyer, they
may resent anyone, including their attorney, who fails to satisfy their wishes at
once. Id.
Moreover, legal problems in criminal or domestic relations areas involve great
emotional distress for the clients. Even in financial controversies, the lawyers
make money off their clients' troubles, leading to increased suspicion. The more
difficult the case (i.e, it is not clear that the client will prevail) the greater the
fees are likely to be in relation to the good results achieved for the client. The
client may feel that the lawyer is the one making the most money from his
problems. Id. at 102L
Clients are suspicious of lawyers because the adversary is a person not a dis-
ease as in medicine. Thus, if the lawyer does not easily vanquish his opponent,
the client may suspect that the lawyer has hidden sympathies for the adversary.
Id. at 1021. "Conflict and potential conflict pervade attorney-client relations, and
prompt an unspoken wariness that inevitably interferes with the profession's ca-
nonical aspirations toward a relationship of undiluted client trust and attorney
loyalty." Id. at 1022.
227. In handling settlement negotiations the personal injury lawyers "cooled the cli-
ent out" or prepared the client to accept less than he anticipated and persuaded
him that it was in his best interest to do so. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 225, at 110.
This was accomplished by inaccurately reporting settlement negotiations to pre-
pare the client to take less. That is, the lawyer, having received an offer of $5,000,
told the client that it was $3,500. Then the lawyer stated that he would try to get
$4,500. When he thereafter reported the $5,000 offer, the client was thrilled and
accepted. Id. at 111. Another way that lawyers manipulated clients into settle-
ments was to make the case seem worse than it was. Id. Finally, few of these
lawyers discussed the details of the suit with the client, even though they recog-
nized that they had a duty to explain the details of a case to the client. Id. at 113.
A similar kind of lawyer-client relatio nship was reported in a study of lawyers
who represent consumers in consumer claims. Rather than knowing the particu-
lar law, lawyers applied their own concepts of fairness. Macaulay, supra note 223,
at 1. Lawyers often mediated the situation by adjusting the client's perception
of the problem based on what the merchant said and convinced the client to take
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individual is often unable to select his lawyer with the same degree of
care as the institutional client.22 Possibly the client does not under-
stand the import of his communication with counsel or is ignorant of
his responsibility to control his lawyer.22 9
When determining whether to hold a client responsible for a law-
yer's procedural errors, the court should thus consider it plausible
that the individual client did not know of the lawyer's actions. If the
lawyer in fact presents the client with his options in a clear manner,
and thereafter gains the client's approval to enter into a settlement,
then the lawyer's actions normally should be upheld. Similarly,
before a court concludes that the client ratified an agreement entered
into by his lawyer, it should ascertain that the client was aware of all
his options, including that of refusing to accept the agreement. Where
the evidence is questionable, ratification should not be presumed.
Allowing the unsophisticated individual a greater opportunity to
overturn his lawyer's decisions will enhance the client's power by en-
the merchant's remedy. Id. at 128. Thus it is likely that the assumption that the
individual client acts as a principal, even in substantive areas where the client is
supposed to be the decision maker, may not reflect reality.
228. Courts have considered that some individual clients may not be able to make a
wise choice of counsel. In refusing to heap on the client the financial penalties
caused by his lawyer's misconduct or incompetence, the court in Jansson v. Fair-
leigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 194, 486 A.2d 920, 922 (1985), noted
that not all individuals are able to separate the good lawyers from the bad.
229. In the divorce context, a study of how lawyers and clients reached decisions also
indicated that clients were not in charge of the process. Sarat & Festiner, Law
and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & Soc'y REv. 93,128 (1986).
The lawyer managed the client towards negotiation, rather than protecting the
client's views or furthering the client's interests. Lawyers gave a personal view of
the law in response to client's questions rather than explaining the law. This
gave the client a view of the system which emphasized personalities and uncer-
tainty. Thus, the client's perception of the process changed; she became increas-
ingly dependent on her lawyer, the client had less control over her life or the
system; and finally, the rational (economic) issues were emphasized over emo-
tional (the client's sense of fairness or justice) ones. Id. at 131-32.
The lawyer described the negotiation process as one where the lawyer has
primacy: the client's role was limited to giving initial instructions and ratifying
the agreement after it was done. If the lawyers were unable to sell their deal to
their clients, then the clients' only alternative was trial. Moreover, if the lawyer
was satisfied with the agreement and the client rejected it, then the lawyer sug-
gested that the client should seek therapy. Id. at 110.
In fixing the goals of a negotiation, the lawyer attempted to focus the client's
attention on the financial issues he thought were important rather than vindicate
the client's sense of injustice. Id. at 112. Surprisingly, the lawyer did not en-
courage the client to be contentious and fight, rather he endorsed settlement and
negotiation, even if the client was ambivalent towards negotiation and in part
interpreted negotiation as capitulation. Id. at 113-15. Ultimately the client gave
the lawyer authority to settle and agreed to the goals. However, the process was
distorted in favor of the lawyer's view of negotiation, in terms of process, issues,
and goals, instead of the client's.
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couraging lawyers to treat him with the same respect that more so-
phisticated litigants typically receive. Accepting the differences that
exist among clients reflects the reality that the lawyer-client relation-
ship, especially in "personal plight"23 0 matters, is not one of undiluted
trust and loyalty.23 1 Courts should be understandably hesitant to fix
the penalty of a lawyer's unauthorized actions on clients who were in
no sense the responsible party.232
Recognizing that individual clients are less likely to be aware of
their lawyers' actions will make it easier to hold lawyers accounta-
ble.23 3 Paternalistic lawyers and those who are overly concerned with
their own personal interests will be reminded that they owe a legal
and ethical duty to listen to this kind of client. Lawyers may be forced
to mend their ways to avoid the embarrassment of clients repeatedly
challenging their actions.
3. The Client's Involvement in the Challenged Action
Under the agency model, apparent authority may bind a client to a
settlement agreement if the client's behavior gives third parties a good
faith belief that the lawyer has authority to act. Courts should con-
tinue to consider whether a client's conduct may have led his oppo-
nent to believe that his lawyer acted with the client's approval. For
230. This term was used to refer to lawyers who typically handle personal injury or
criminal matters in a study of the structure of the Chicago Bar. J. HEINZ & E.
LAutuANN, supra note 220, at 378. These lawyers were a subgroup of the personal
sector lawyers, those who represent individuals or small businesses. Id.
231. A study showed that the sources of a lawyer's business also influences how defer-
ential a lawyer will be to the client. Kritzer, The Dimensions of Lawyer-Client
Relations: Notes Toward a Theory and a Field Study, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.
409, 423-24. On-going professional and personal relationships with corporate cli-
ents may limit the lawyer's autonomy.
Personal plight sector lawyers, in contrast, are answerable to people other
than clients: court clerks and bailiffs, insurance claims adjustors, and brokers
among others. These individuals are important sources of referrals and also af-
fect the lawyer's ability to practice efficiently. Since the practice depends on vol-
ume, the lawyer may be more willing to cultivate and accommodate relationships
with these people rather than a client whom he may never see again. J. HENZ &
E. LAUMANN, supra note 220, at 364. He may be in a stronger position to define
the client's needs, modify his goals, and determine how those needs will be met.
Personal plight clients may have less clout because the lawyer is working on a
contingency fee or the fee is being paid by a third party (insurance). Kritzer,
supra, at 413.
232. Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 195, 486 A.2d 920, 923
(1985)(clients repeatedly inquired about the status of the case and they had no
reason to know or suspect that their attorney was not performing his duties).
233. This would provide the client with recourse other than malpractice or discipline.
The plaintiff's burden in malpractice actions is severe. See R MALLEN & V.
Lnvrr, LFn MALPRAcTICE § 650, at 796-99, § 656, at 810-11 (2d ed. 1981). Disci-




instance, a client may create a situation where it appears that the law-
yer is negotiating with authority and then seek to renege on the agree-
ment because the client has second thoughts or thinks he might be
may able to achieve a better result.
Under the agency model, a client is usually deemed bound by his
lawyer's procedural acts and thus bears the brunt of an attorney's mis-
takes. Under the proposed model, instead of presuming that clients
are bound, courts should consider to what extent the client in fact par-
ticipated in, or is responsible for, the challenged decision or action. If,
for example, the lawyer engaged in dilatory or negligent behavior over
an extended period of time and the client was aware of this behavior
but took no steps to correct it, then the client should not be permitted
to set aside a default or other penalty imposed against him. Similarly,
if the client was a contributory cause for his lawyer's misconduct, for
example, failure to comply with discovery brought about by a lack of
cooperation with counsel, the client should not escape the conse-
quences of his errors.
The extent to which a client may have contributed to the chal-
lenged action is a factor similar to the equitable doctrine of "unclean
hands." It would allow the courts to deny relief to a client whose own
behavior contributed to the problem for which he now asks the court's
assistance. In addition, a court could deny relief to a client who re-
peatedly brings motions to be relieved of his lawyer's acts if the client
made no efforts to correct his lawyer's behavior.
4. The Degree of Prejudice to the Client
The extent to which the lawyer's conduct will harm the client is
another factor which courts should consider in determining whether
or not to relieve a client of his attorney's actions. A client should not
be totally deprived of his day in court or robbed of a vital defense,
simply because strict application of agency theory would uphold the
action of an unscrupulous or incompetent lawyer. Rather than punish
an innocent client, the court should be willing to set aside the chal-
lenged action, especially if this can be done with minimal harm to the
interests of other parties.
The court must thus evaluate the significance of the lawyer's ac-
tion. The degree of prejudice to the client may vary from a total loss
of a claim or defense, to merely being unable to call a particular wit-
ness at trial. A client need not have the power to challenge every tac-
tical decision that his lawyer makes in the course of representation.
Between these extremes are a variety of lawyer mistakes which
have different effects on the client. For example, the failure to make
discovery may lead to certain critical issues being deemed resolved
against the client or to the denial of certain defenses which may be
fatal to the client's case. The court may deem that it has personal ju-
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risdiction over a defendant if his lawyer failed to file a motion to quash
service of process before filing an answer. This may force the defend-
ant to litigate in an unfavorable jurisdiction, but it does not equate
with being denied a defense in toto. If the court upholds a settlement
agreement over the client's protests, the result may not be as satisfac-
tory as the client had expected, but, again, it will not ordinarily repre-
sent a complete loss. The more compelling the case for the client, the
more compelling the case for granting relief.
B. The Effect on the Other Parties to the Litigation
The foregoing factors seek to determine the strength of the client's
interest in being relieved of the consequences of his lawyer's conduct.
Once the court has assessed these, it should next consider whether
granting the client's request will adversely affect other parties and
whether means exist for alleviating any such prejudice. Under the
agency model some courts have attempted to take these concerns into
account through the application of estoppel principles.23 4 These con-
siderations would now assume significance in all cases where a client
urges that he should not be bound by the actions of counsel.
If the matter has not already been tried, then merely requiring a
third party to submit to an initial adjudication on the merits is not
unfairly burdensome. That party's economic cost or psychological
stress is the same as would have been experienced had the opposing
counsel not acted improperly. The third party has no legitimate right
to benefit from his opponent's mistake, absent a greater showing of
prejudice.
On the other hand, if the third party must retry a matter already
litigated and which he legitimately thought was disposed of, then his
prejudice is more weighty. There comes a time when he should know
that a matter is over. Litigation is stressful, expensive, and inefficient
and should not be unnecessarily prolonged or duplicated. Moreover, if
the third party suffers some additional prejudice, such as lost tactical
surprise or the loss of witnesses or evidence, then his interests have an
even stronger claim to being accommodated.
Where relieving a client of his attorney's mistake could cause seri-
ous harm to third parties, courts should explore means of reducing
that prejudice before concluding that the client is bound by his law-
yer's conduct. This is especially true where the prejudice to a client
would be severe, as in the case of dismissal. Perhaps, due to the cli-
ent's delay, certain issues or claims could be excluded if the opponent's
evidence is lost or his witnesses have become unavailable.235 Another
234. Yanchor v. Kagan, 22 Cal. App. 3d 544,99 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1971)(noting that appar-
ent authority rests upon the doctrine of estoppel).
235. See Negligent Litigation, supra note 176, at 1243.
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possibility is that sanctions could be imposed against the lawyer and/
or the client for improper behavior. The extra attorney's fees and
costs that the third party will incur if a dismissed action is revived
might be shifted to the opposing lawyer or his client if they subse-
quently lose on the merits. 2 6 Likewise, if the client is permitted to
reopen a settled matter and recovers less than the settlement value at
trial, then he could be required to bear the other side's added fees and
costs. It is important to note that fee shifting practices must also be
tempered. Clients should not be unduly penalized for pursuing cases
or for having unknowingly chosen an incompetent lawyer.
C. Effect on the Judicial Process
Along with prejudice to other parties, courts should consider the
extent to which relieving a client of his lawyer's actions might ad-
versely affect the judicial system. This inquiry involves several dis-
tinct concerns including the danger of encouraging aberrant behavior
by both lawyers and clients and fairness to other litigants whose ac-
tions may be delayed if this client's case is allowed to proceed.
The first concern is that if courts too readily relieve lawyers and
clients of the effects of improper actions, shoddy practice may be en-
couraged. Yet, using the agency theory to simply impose liability on
the client does not discourage lawyers' delinquent behavior because
the wrong person is forced to bear the cost. Clients often may not be
aware of or responsible for their lawyers' behavior. Therefore courts
should attempt to locate and sanction the person responsible for the
abuse or delay through devices such as Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11, rather than terminate the action or otherwise penalize the
client.
The second concern is that reopening actions will clog the courts
and deny other litigants their opportunity to compete for scarce judi-
cial resources. However, if clients are denied relief at the trial level,
they will often be forced to pursue a malpractice remedy or appeal to a
higher court to reinstate the action. These remedies do not effect any
reduction in civil litigation, but instead merely shift cases to a higher
court or a different arena.23 7 Moreover, the difficulties a client faces
in prevailing in a malpractice action may allow the lawyer to escape
with impunity.
In summary, resolving decisionmaking disputes should involve the
weighing of the client's interests versus those of other parties to the
litigation and the public's interest in an efficient judicial system. This
will mean abandoning the litmus test of agency theory in favor of a
236. Id. at 1241.
237. See Dismissal with Prejudice, supra note 176, at 217-18.
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more flexible approach which will produce less tortured decisions and
in many cases more equitable results.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE SUGGESTED MODEL
In the following discussion the proposed balancing model is applied
to five cases in which clients attempted to set aside settlement agree-
ments. In one, the result is the same as that reached under the agency
model, but the reasoning is more straightforward. In two, the out-
comes are different, but the model justifies the results. And in the
final two, the model indicates the kinds of inquiries courts should
make to resolve disputes.
A. Terrain Enterprises, Inc. v. Western Casualty and Surety Co.ss
In Terrain, a settlement agreement was reached when the plain-
tiff's lawyer's $65,000 offer was accepted by the defendant's lawyer.
The plaintiff then disavowed the settlement on the grounds that the
offer was unauthorized. When the case was tried, the plaintiff recov-
ered over $1,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.239 The
court of appeals overturned the verdict, concluding that the plaintiff
was bound by the settlement agreement. It applied the agency model
and found that the plaintiff's lawyer had apparent authority to make
the offer based on the fact that the plaintiff hired the lawyer and the
lawyer attended and took depositions, engaged in other discovery, cor-
responded with counsel for the defendant, and participated in all pre-
trial conferences and hearings.240
If this case were analyzed under the suggested model, the court
would have expressly considered facts other than those which it inter-
preted to prove apparent authority. First, it should have examined the
nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and its lawyer. The
court of appeals disregarded the trial court's finding that the plaintiff
and its lawyer had a misunderstanding regarding the lawyer's author-
ity to settle. If the court knew more about their interaction, the court
could have assessed its significance. For example, if the settlement
were enforced, would that defeat the client's legitimate expectation
that it would retain authority over the handling of this case.
In addition, the court could have considered the sophistication of
the client, a factor which it did not even mention. The plaintiff was a
corporate land developer involved in major litigation about a subdivi-
sion. The court should have inquired as to whether it was likely that
such a plaintiff would have been unaware of an offer to settle put
forth by its lawyer.
238. 774 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1985).
239. Id. at 1321.
240. Id. at 1322.
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The court of appeals found that the plaintiff was involved in the
disputed settlement because it had hired a lawyer who then repre-
sented it in various stages of the litigation. Yet the facts indicate that
the plaintiff did nothing more than have its lawyer perform ordinary
tasks in the course of civil litigation.2 41 No facts demonstrate that the
client played an unusual role in the settlement process.
The possible prejudice to plaintiff if the settlement were upheld
was also unaddressed by the court. The plaintiff lost the opportunity
to collect $283,000 in compensatory damages, even if the punitive dam-
ages were disallowed on appeal. On the other hand, it would still re-
cover $65,000 under the settlement, and therefore would not be denied
all recovery.
In assessing the countervailing interests, the court should have
considered that the defendant would suffer serious prejudice if the
$1,000,000 trial judgment were upheld. Even if the court eliminated
what it thought were the improper punitive damages,2 42 the compen-
satory damages were still several times the plaintiff's $50,000 actual
damages under the contract.243
On balance, the decisive factors here would appear to be the pre-
sumably sophisticated plaintiff and the severe prejudice that the de-
fendant would otherwise suffer were the settlement agreement set
aside. The result in Terrain was thus a correct one. However, had the
court analyzed the case in terms of the proposed model, rather than
relying on rather flimsy evidence of apparent authority, its decision
would have been less tortured and more easily understood.
B. Worthy v. McKesson Corp.244
In Worthy, the plaintiff agreed to a $15,000 settlement of his em-
ployment discrimination claim negotiated and explained to him by his
lawyers. A few days later, the plaintiff spoke to another lawyer who
advised him not to settle the case. Over the client's objection that he
241. But cf. Fennell v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1989)(the court re-
jected a settlement even though the plaintiff in this wrongful discharge action
knew that a settlement was being discussed; he did not tell his lawyer to stop
discussing settlement; he would have taken more money ($50,000) than the
$10,000 his lawyer settled for;, and he did not tell opposing counsel that his law-
yer's authority was limited); Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 390 (3d Cir.
1986) (the following four factors were insufficient to prove that the plaintiff's law-
yer had apparent authority to settle at a pre-trial conference: 1) the same lawyer
had represented plaintiffs throughout the suit; 2) the lawyer had transmitted all
communications between the defendants and the plaintiffs; 3) the pretrial order
required the lawyer to appear with the client or have authority to settle; and 4)
the client had allowed the lawyer to select the examining physician).
242. Terrain Enterprises, Inc. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 774 F.2d 1320, 1322
n.1 (5th Cir. 1985).
243. Id. at 1321.
244. 756 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1985).
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had not intended to relinquish his wrongful termination claims, the
court enforced the agreement, ruling that the plaintiff could not
change his mind simply because he was dissatisfied with the agree-
ment, and that his lawyer, who had represented him throughout the
litigation and who consulted with him about the settlement, had full
authority to settle.245
In traditional agency terms, the result in Worthy is readily ex-
plained: the plaintiff expressly authorized his lawyer to accept the de-
fendant's offer. However, under the suggested model, the result
might have been different. The nature of this particular lawyer-client
relationship is unclear. While it did entail discussions between the
lawyer and the client about both the settlement offer and the effect of
a settlement, the plaintiff still felt an immediate need to consult an-
other attorney for a "second opinion."2 46 The court did not delve any
further into their actual understanding and instead accepted the law-
yer's statements that the client understood the effect of the settlement
agreement.
The sophistication of the client was another unexplored factor.
The plaintiff was a field sales manager who brought an employment
discrimination claim against his employer. From this brief informa-
tion, we do not know whether the plaintiff was experienced with the
legal system, or a novice who did not understand the binding nature of
settlement agreements. Some courts have treated employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs with special deference because they serve an im-
portant role as a "private attorney general" in enforcing the policies of
Title VII.247 The plaintiff in Worthy received no such consideration.
Another factor relevant under the proposed model is that the cli-
ent was involved in bringing about the action he later challenged. He
was present at his deposition when settlement was first discussed; he
authorized his lawyer to make a demand of $26,000; and, at least ac-
cording to his lawyers, he accepted the defendant's $15,000
counteroffer.248
The degree of prejudice to the plaintiff from upholding the settle-
ment is unclear. On the one hand, he would forfeit his right to a trial
on the merits. The facts do not indicate what the second lawyer's
opinion of the case was. The plaintiff's first lawyer may have settled
too cheaply. On the other hand, the $15,000 settlement compares fa-
245. Id. at 1372-73.
246. Id. at 1372.
247. Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1981). After the plaintiff's lawyer
negotiated an agreement for $750 and both attorneys signed a proposed consent
order, the court upheld the plaintiff's right to reject the settlement and return
the check. The court also noted that such plaintiffs are treated as "sort of wards
of the court" and that waivers of their cause of action should be carefully ex-
amined. Id. at 252-53.
248. Worthy v. McKesson Corp., 756 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1985).
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vorably with the $26,000 the plaintiff was willing to accept. Thus, his
recovery under the settlement at least approximated his own valua-
tion of his case.
In terms of countervailing interests, the court never identified the
prejudice to the defendant if the plaintiff were allowed to reopen the
matter. The plaintiff waited only six days to reject the purported set-
tlement. Obviously in that short period of time, the defendant could
suffer little harm to its case. Nor would relieving the plaintiff of his
lawyer's action harm judicial efficiency. The matter had never been
tried. Thus, the court would not have been forced to rehear a matter
it had already decided, and other litigants would not therefore suffer
undue delay.
In sum, if the court had followed the analysis proposed here, it is
entirely possible that the plaintiff would have been granted relief.
Neither the defendant nor the courts would suffer any harm strong
enough to outweigh the plaintiff's interests in having his case heard
on the merits and in protecting his right to make a fully informed
decision about the disposition of his claim. If the court believed that
the client had in fact contributed to the challenged action, it could
temper relief with a fee shifting provision. For example, the plaintiff
might be required to pay the defendant's cost in fighting the settle-
ment motion, or, if the plaintiff did not achieve a more favorable re-
sult at trial, he could be compelled to bear all or part of the
defendant's fees and costs for trial.
C. Wong v. Bailey249
In Wong, a personal injury suit, the court enforced an oral settle-
ment with the insurer of the driver and owner of the car which struck
the auto in which the plaintiff was a passenger. Later, realizing that he
had failed to specifically preserve the plaintiff's rights against the
driver of the car in which she was riding, the plaintiff's lawyer refused
to sign a written agreement which contained general release language.
The court ruled, however, that under Georgia law the attorney's oral
consent to the settlement without an objection to a general release
was binding on the client.2 =0
The result in Wong is explained by the court's application of Geor-
gia law under which a lawyer's assent binds his client to a settle-
ment.25 1 Moreover, the court pointed out that the lawyer had failed to
realize the need for the special language until after he had orally
agreed to the settlement; that this was a matter within the lawyer's
domain of authority; and that if he had failed to protect his client's
249. 752 F.2d 619 (11th Cir. 1985).
250. Id. at 621.
251. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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claim, then the plaintiff could sue him for malpractice.252
Not only is this result inconsistent with the traditional agency
model, it also would not stand under the model proposed here. The
conclusive presumption that a lawyer's assent to an agreement is auto-
matically binding on his client completely undermines the interest of
the client - sophisticated or unsophisticated - in making informed
decisions about the management of her case. In addition, in this case
there was no evidence that the plaintiff had in any way contributed to
the challenged action; the mistake was entirely the lawyer's. The
prejudice to the plaintiff is obvious, for she is barred from pursuing
any claim against the driver.
The countervailing harm to the defendant was minimal. The plain-
tiff's lawyer objected to the general release within two weeks of re-
ceiving it, too short a period for the defense to have been harmed.253
Moreover, nothing in the opinion explains why the defendant's insur-
ance company refused to substitute a limited release in place of the
general release. Possibly the same company was the insurer of the
other potential defendant, and by insisting on a general release it
would avoid paying under that policy. Yet, the court never addressed
the prejudice that either the driver or his insurer would suffer if the
plaintiff were granted relief.
The only plausible interest to be served by enforcing this agree-
ment is that of the public in an efficient judicial system. If a lawyer's
assent to a settlement agreement is regularly upheld, the courts will
be able to dispose of litigation more easily. However, in this case that
interest is ephemeral because, as even the court acknowledges, the cli-
ent no doubt will seek relief against her lawyer in a malpractice law-
suit. Thus, applying the suggested model in this case demonstrates
that the Georgia presumption, while no doubt convenient for the
courts, overrides other far more compelling interests.
D. Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Paramount Industries,
Inc. 5
In Greater Kansas City, the court held that two individual defend-
ants were entitled to a hearing to determine whether their lawyer had
authority to enter into a pre-trial agreement making them personal
guarantors if the defendant corporations did not honor an agreement
settling a labor pension fund dispute.255 The individuals asserted that
their lawyer had not explained to them the significance of personal
guarantees and had failed to obtain their express consent to the agree-
252. Wong v. Bailey, 752 F.2d 619, 621 (11th Cir. 1985).
253. rd. at 620.
254. 829 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1987).
255. Id. at 645-46.
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ment.2 1% The lawyer agreed that he had not fully explained the legal
significance of the personal guarantee.2 5 7
If, in the hearing on remand, the court followed the proposed
model, it would consider whether the lawyer failed to live up to his
responsibilities within the lawyer-client relationship by not explaining
the agreement to his clients. If that was the case, then the client's
consent was tainted. However, these clients were sophisticated busi-
nessmen and a personal guarantee is a common business transaction.
Therefore, it seems rather unlikely that they did not understand its
significance or that their lawyer would have settled a matter exposing
them to a $41,000 liability without consulting them.
The court on remand should also consider whether the clients con-
tributed to the challenged action by not being present when the settle-
ment was read into the record.258 The court should also evaluate the
prejudice to the clients created by upholding the settlement. The
harm will vary inversely with the financial condition of the defendant
corporations. In addition the court should determine whether settle-
ment would force the clients to forfeit defenses to the underlying
claim as well.
After evaluating the clients' interests, the court should consider
any countervailing interests of the plaintiffs. Here, because the mat-
ter was settled before there had been a trial on the merits, granting
relief would not unduly prolong this litigation. However, the plain-
tiffs were four union trust funds seeking collection of unpaid fringe
benefit contributions, and the prejudice to the union membership
from unpaid contributions could be great depending on the liquidity of
the funds. The court should consider whether or not the funds have
sufficient money to pay current pensions or other benefits. In this
case third parties may have important interests at stake.
Finally, the court should examine the effect on judicial efficiency if
clients are allowed to avoid the effects of their lawyer's shoddy prac-
tices. Rather than completely deny the clients their defense, this may
be an appropriate case for sanctions against both the lawyer and his
clients: the lawyer for his admitted failure to adequately explain the
agreement to his clients and the clients for not attending the hearing
at which the stipulated judgment was read into the record.
Without further facts the result of this analysis is uncertain. How-
ever, the clients would have to overcome the indications that their
own inattention to this matter was a contributing cause of their law-
yer's conduct. If the court did decide to set aside the settlement
256. Id. at 646.
257. Id. at 645 n.1.
258. The lawyer appeared before the court, read the settlement into the record, and
represented that his clients were willing to settle the case on those terms. Id. at
645.
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agreement, at a minimum the court should sanction the lawyer and his
clients for forcing their opponents and the judicial system to deal with
a problem that could have been avoided.
E. In re Marriage of Helsel259
In Helsel, the appellate court in a dissolution modification action
ruled that a husband's attorney lacked the authority, in his client's
absence, to enter into a courthouse stipulation to the extent that it
resolved certain contested issues that were "central to the contro-
versy."260 If, on remand, the trial court determined that these issues
were not central, then the stipulation was to be enforced against the
client even though it was unauthorized. In the latter case, the client's
only recourse would be to institute malpractice or disciplinary pro-
ceedings against his lawyer.26 '
This decision added a new level of complexity to the substance/
procedure analysis where courts are dealing with partial stipula-
tions.262 Before ever reaching the issue of authority, the court must
first determine the importance of the agreement; that is, whether it is
purely procedural, purely substantive (e.g., involves a "substantial"
right, or a total settlement of the case), or somewhere in the middle,
(e.g., a substantial resolution of the dispute, or merely the "winnowing
of the issues" in the context of settlement).263 To divide the middle
group, the court suggested the application of two factors: first, how
the stipulation compares to the result that the client urges is justified
by the facts; and second, the economic value of the stipulation in both
comparative and absolute terms.264 If it is determined that the stipu-
lation was substantive, then the trial court must decide if the lawyer
had express, apparent or implied authority to settle.265
If a court were to decide this dispute under the model proposed
here, it would proceed in a more straightforward fashion, although it
would still take the client's interests into consideration. First, the
court would consider the nature of the lawyer-client relationship,
rather than focus on the events of the one particular day when the
client was absent from court. The court appearance might have been
the culmination of a series of meetings and negotiations in which the
parties and their lawyers had attempted to work out a modification of
259. 198 Cal. App. 3d 332, 243 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1988).
260. Id. at 339, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
261. Id. at 338, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 66L
262. In fact, on remand the trial judge did not follow the appellate court's directions,
ruling that the client had approved the stipulation but had subsequently changed
his mind. Telephone interview with Richard D. Ring, attorney for petitioner/wife
(June, 1989).
263. In re Marriage of Helsel, 198 Cal. App. 3d 332, 339, 243 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661 (1988).
264. Id. at 339-40, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62.
265. Id. at 340, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
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the judgment. If so, the lawyer and the client may have decided on
the allocation of authority, either over their retainer agreement or in
the course of the representation. This would shed some light on the
client's expectations when his lawyer then negotiated in his absence.
The level of this client's sophistication would tend to indicate that
he should be bound by the agreement. He was a doctor.266 Moreover,
the modification proceeding took place some thirteen years after the
original dissolution judgment was entered. Therefore, it is likely that
this client was quite familiar with and understood the legal system.
He is probably not the type of client who needs special protection from
paternalistic lawyers.
In addition, the client may have contributed to the challenged ac-
tion. As the trial judge noted, he voluntarily absented himself from
court,267 though the reason for his absence is unclear. In addition his
lawyer spoke with him on the telephone before the proceeding and
the lawyer told the court that his client had agreed to the oral stipula-
tion. The client may be able to show that his lawyer misunderstood
him or violated their understanding about decision making authority.
On the other hand, he may have indicated to his lawyer that he ap-
proved the agreement.
The prejudice to the client if the agreement were enforced can be
determined from its terms. The stipulation increased the husband's
child support obligation from $200 to $500 per month, determined the
distribution of $15,000 held in trust under the dissolution, and ordered
payment of $750 as the wife's attorney's fees.268 It left unresolved the
amount of accrued child support he owed and other unspecified issues.
The stipulated terms, while significant, are not tantamount to a termi-
nation of his entire claim. For instance, he may be able to seek a modi-
fication of the child support order. At the same time, an increase of
$300 per month in support and the distribution of $15,000 in funds are
not insignificant.
On the other side of the balance, the court never explicitly consid-
ered the interests of the wife. It noted that the client should pay the
wife's attorneys's fees incurred in negotiating the stipulation and in
opposing the husband's motion.269 However, it failed to consider
whether the wife had the financial ability to continue to pursue post
judgment relief thirteen years after the original dissolution decree.
Nor does awarding her attorney's fees also compensate for the emo-
tional strain of the continued litigation.
Finally, the trial court expressed grave concern about the effect on
the judicial system, and in particular on the very busy dissolution
266. Id. at 336 n.2, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 659 n.2.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 336, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
269. Id. at 340 n.7, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 662 n.7.
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courts, if clients could be relieved of a stipulation, entered during their
voluntary absence, by simply asserting that their lawyer lacked au-
thority.2 7 0 The court of appeals, on the other hand, argued that the
use of fee shifting would deter clients from making frivolous mo-
tions.271 What is not in dispute is that the trial court would continue
to be involved with this matter, whether the stipulation is set aside or
not, since several issues remained unresolved. Thus, allowing the cli-
ent to contest these additional issues may have only a minimal effect
on the dissolution calendar while avoiding a malpractice action in the
regular civil court.
If the Helsel court applied the proposed balancing model and deter-
mined that the husband was consulted by his lawyer, understood the
operations of the legal system, contributed to the problem by his vol-
untary absence, and would not suffer undue prejudice if he were com-
pelled to comply with the stipulation, then he should be denied relief.
On the other hand, if the court found that his interest in informed
decision making was substantial, that his absence was excusable de-
spite his knowledge of the legal system, and that the terms of the stip-
ulation were significant to him, then it should grant him relief. By
ordering him to pay his wife's attorney's fees, the court could mini-
mize the prejudice to her and deter frivolous motions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The law of lawyering is traditionally thought of as a specialized
area of the common law of agency. It is therefore not surprising that
the basic framework of the first Restatement of the Law ofLawyering,
now in preparation, will be the law of agency.272 This Article has ar-
gued that the agency model has not proven effective for resolving dis-
putes about the allocation of decision making authority between
lawyers and clients. Typically courts have attempted to decide such
cases by drawing a distinction between substance and procedure. Sub-
stantive matters, such as settlement, are regarded as within the cli-
ent's area of control, while procedural matters, such as strategy and
tactics, fall within the lawyer's domain. However the cases are incon-
sistent, frequently abandoning or finding exceptions to the these prin-
ciples. As a result, courts often bind clients to settlement agreements
to which they object, while relieving them of the prejudicial effects of
their lawyers' procedural errors.
The factors which have caused the courts to make these exceptions
can be discerned from an analysis of the relevant case law and schol-
arly literature. This Article has offered a proposal which directly ad-
270. Id. at 336 n.2, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 659 n.2.
271. Id. at 340 n.7, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 662 n.7.
272. Mayne, Law of Lawyering Restatement Begun, LITIGATION, Feb. 1989, at 1, 5.
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dresses those factors. Under the model offered here, courts should
inquire as to the nature of the lawyer-client relationship; the sophisti-
cation of the client; the extent to which the client may have contrib-
uted to the challenged action; and the prejudice to the client if he is
deemed bound by his lawyer's actions. Courts must then balance
these interests against those of opponents who may be prejudiced if
the action in question is overturned and of a judicial system concerned
with efficiency and controlling lawyer and client misconduct.
This suggested approach is preferable to the pseudo-litmus test of
the agency model. In addition to providing a more straightforward
method of analysis, it is based upon a more realistic view of the law-
yer-client relationship, and, in its application, will encourage better
lawyer-client communication.
